The Admissibility of Sampling Evidence to Prove Individual Damages in Class Actions by Bavli, Hillel J. & Felter, John Kenneth
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 2 Article 5
2-28-2018
The Admissibility of Sampling Evidence to Prove
Individual Damages in Class Actions
Hillel J. Bavli
Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science, hbavli@fas.harvard.edu
John Kenneth Felter
Ropes & Gray LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hillel J. Bavli & John K. Felter, The Admissibility of Sampling Evidence to Prove Individual Damages in Class Actions, 59 B.C.L. Rev. 655
(2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss2/5
  655 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE 
TO PROVE INDIVIDUAL DAMAGES  
IN CLASS ACTIONS 
HILLEL J. BAVLI  
JOHN KENNETH FELTER 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................. 657 
I. DEMISE AND REVIVAL OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE  IN FEDERAL COURT CLASS ACTIONS .................................................... 659 
A. Wal-Mart v. Dukes ............................................................................................................................................ 661 
B. Tyson v. Bouaphakeo ........................................................................................................................................ 663 
C. Harmonizing Wal-Mart and Tyson .................................................................................................................... 667 
D. Brief Bleak History of Sampling Evidence in  Federal Court Class Actions ......................................................... 669 
1. Cimino v. Raymark Industries ....................................................................................................................... 669 
2. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos ............................................................................................................................. 671 
II. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS CERTIFICATION DISPUTES ....................................................................................... 674 
A. Admissibility of Expert Evidence ........................................................................................................................ 674 
B. Admissibility of Sampling Evidence .................................................................................................................... 678 
C. Generally Accepted Statistical Standards ........................................................................................................... 680 
D. Daubert and Class Certification Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 682 
III. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS ACTION PREREQUISITES: COMMONALITY, PREDOMINANCE, AND SUPERIORITY .......... 684 
A. Commonality ..................................................................................................................................................... 685 
B. Predominance ................................................................................................................................................... 686 
C. Superiority ........................................................................................................................................................ 690 
D. Aggregate Damages and Individual Damages .................................................................................................... 691 
E. Bifurcation ........................................................................................................................................................ 697 
F. Sampling and Extrapolation ............................................................................................................................... 699 
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE TO  PROVE INDIVIDUAL DAMAGES ................................................................ 701 
A. Revisiting Tyson ................................................................................................................................................ 701 
B. Threshold for Homogeneity ................................................................................................................................ 704 
C. Claim Variability and Judgment Variability ....................................................................................................... 704 
D. Variability, Accuracy, and Evidentiary Reliability .............................................................................................. 704 
E. Implications of Sampling for Accuracy and Reliability ........................................................................................ 707 
F. Threshold for Admissibility ................................................................................................................................ 710 
G. Hierarchical Model ........................................................................................................................................... 710 
H. Correlation ....................................................................................................................................................... 715 
I. Estimating Claim Variability and Judgment Variability........................................................................................ 717 
J. Claim Variability and Samples ............................................................................................................................ 717 
K. Judgment Variability and “Test Cases” ............................................................................................................. 719 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................ 722 
 
  656 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SAMPLING 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE INDIVIDUAL 
DAMAGES IN CLASS ACTIONS 
HILLEL J. BAVLI∗  
JOHN KENNETH FELTER∗∗ 
Abstract: The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo revived the use of “representative” or sampling evidence in class 
actions. Federal courts are now more receptive to class plaintiffs’ efforts to 
prove classwide liability and, occasionally, aggregate damages, with sampling 
evidence. However, federal courts still routinely deny motions for class 
certification because they find that calculations of class members’ individual 
damages defeat the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). As a result, 
meritorious classwide claims founder. In this paper, we combine legal and 
statistical analyses and propose a novel solution to this dilemma that adheres to 
the Tyson decision while satisfying Daubert, the standards of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, and the prerequisites for Rule 23(b)(3) classes. We develop a 
method and derive a threshold to determine whether class damages claims are 
sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to 
prove individual damages. Relying on Daubert and its progeny, as well as other 
well-recognized authority, we argue that accuracy is an appropriate standard for 
evidentiary reliability. Then, using generally accepted statistical methods and 
standards, we show that, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability 
(terms we define), sampling evidence improves accuracy and evidentiary 
reliability and is, therefore, admissible in Rule 23(b)(3) class certification 
proceedings. We also recommend several procedures to evaluate whether 
damages claims of a putative class satisfy the derived threshold. We conclude 
that our proposed method to prove individual damages achieves the Supreme 
Court’s stated goals of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, “economies of time, effort, 
and expense” and the promotion of “uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about 
other undesirable results.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs moving for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must demonstrate, among other things, that 
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”1 To establish predominance, 
plaintiffs must show that common classwide proof can resolve one or more 
liability or damages issues, and that individual inquiries—those necessitating 
the introduction of evidence that varies from member to member—are not 
qualitatively more significant than common issues. Putative class plaintiffs 
have proposed methods to prove classwide liability or damages by proffering 
sampling evidence, contending that common questions predominate over 
individual questions notwithstanding the existence of differences among class 
members’ claims. They have argued that it is appropriate to extrapolate from 
adjudications of a representative sample of class members’ claims to 
determine classwide liability or to calculate classwide damages. However, 
federal courts have rarely accepted these arguments. 
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected as “Trial by Formula” a proposal to extrapolate classwide 
liability and damages based on a small sample of claims selected for 
individual adjudications.2 Two years later, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, after 
confirming that federal district courts must perform a “rigorous analysis” to 
test whether plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
standard, the Court arguably raised the evidentiary bar when it reversed a 
class certification order.3 The Court held that the Third Circuit committed 
reversible error by refusing to consider whether a proposed statistical model 
was capable of proving classwide damages.4 Wal-Mart and Comcast were 
generally viewed as the death knell for sampling evidence in class actions.5 
In 2016, however, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Court 
approved the admissibility of “representative evidence” to prove classwide 
liability.6 More specifically, it held that “[o]ne way for [class plaintiffs] to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 2 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
 3 569 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Comcast can be read to suggest that predominance is not satisfied unless damages can be 
determined on a classwide basis. See id. at 34. However, most courts do not interpret Comcast so 
broadly, finding predominance of other common issues, even if individual damages calculations 
are necessary. See, e.g., Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 375 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 
F.3d 790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 
722 F.3d 838, 859–60 (6th Cir. 2013); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th 
Cir. 2013). In any event, it is now settled that solely the need to calculate individual damages will 
not defeat certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.  
 6 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016). 
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show . . . that the sample relied upon . . . is a permissible method of proving 
classwide liability is by showing that each class member could have relied on 
that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual 
action.”7 The Court explained that the admissibility of “representative 
evidence” turns on its relevance and, most importantly, its reliability.8 
Tyson may usher in a revival of sampling evidence in class action 
litigation.9 After Tyson, class plaintiffs are increasingly offering 
“representative evidence,” including sampling evidence, as a method to prove 
classwide liability to satisfy the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). 
But the permissibility of sampling evidence to prove classwide damages—
and especially individual damages—remains uncertain and controversial. 
Frequently, when a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class asserts individual damages 
claims, federal district courts decide to certify a class to determine classwide 
liability issues, and perhaps even aggregate damages issues, but reserve the 
calculations of individual class members’ damages for separate adjudications. 
Even more often, if the calculations of individual damages cannot be 
computed formulaically, federal district courts find that individual issues 
predominate over common issues, and refuse to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class. 
In this Article, we argue that, in appropriate circumstances, sampling 
evidence is admissible to meet the predominance standard and as a method to 
prove individual damages when plaintiffs move for class certification 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). We answer a threshold question: When does 
sampling evidence, offered to prove individual damages in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action, pass muster under governing evidentiary standards? We explain 
that, whether sampling evidence is admissible, and whether a federal district 
court will certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class based on such evidence, depend on the 
relevance and reliability of the proffered evidence. We explore the 
circumstances under which sampling evidence establishing individual 
damages satisfies these governing evidentiary standards. 
After this brief introduction, in Part I, as historical background, we 
discuss the demise and revival of sampling evidence in federal court class 
actions. In Part II, we analyze the evidentiary law governing the admissibility 
of expert evidence in class certification disputes. In Part III, we examine the 
Rule 23(b)(3) class-action prerequisites of commonality, predominance, and 
superiority, with a focus on predominance. We also summarize the 
circumstances under which federal district courts have generally found that, 
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, common issues predominate over individual 
issues, notwithstanding variable individual damages. We next discuss the 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. at 1046–47. 
 8 Id. at 1046. 
 9 See Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action 
Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1807, 1845 (2017) (“Still, Tyson may be a big case. It may herald a 
more pragmatic approach in Supreme Court assessments of class certification.”). 
2018] The Admissibility of Sampling Evidence 659 
admissibility of expert evidence, and sampling evidence in particular, to 
prove individual damages in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. In Part IV, we 
propose a statistical method to support the introduction of sampling evidence 
during class certification proceedings that satisfies Daubert, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 standards that govern the admissibility of expert evidence, and 
the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). We develop a method and 
derive a threshold to determine whether class damages claims are sufficiently 
homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to prove 
individual damages. We argue that accuracy is an appropriate standard for 
evidentiary reliability and show that, when judgment variability exceeds 
claim variability (terms we define), sampling evidence improves accuracy 
and evidentiary reliability, and is admissible. Finally, we conclude that our 
proposed method to prove individual damages achieves the Supreme Court’s 
stated goals for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, “economies of time, effort, and 
expense” and the promotion of “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly 
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 
undesirable results.”10 
I. DEMISE AND REVIVAL OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE  
IN FEDERAL COURT CLASS ACTIONS 
After the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, several commentators declared that the use of statistical evidence to 
prove liability or damages in class actions was dead or, at best, moribund.11 In 
2016, however, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Court clarified that: 
“Wal-Mart does not stand for the broad proposition that a representative 
sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability.”12 Thus, 
to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of statistical evidence in 
class actions proved to be an exaggeration. The Tyson Court proclaimed: 
“Whether and when statistical evidence can be used to establish classwide 
liability will depend on the purpose for which the evidence is being 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615, 634 (1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment). 
 11 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trial by Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2015) 
(“[T]rial by statistics died on June 20, 2011 [date of Wal-Mart decision]. . . . The notion that a court 
could try a representative sample of monetary claims and extrapolate the average result to the 
remainder of the cases was finished.”); Wenbo Whang, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo: The Use of 
Statistical Evidence in Class Actions, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 133, 133 (2016), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=djclpp_sidebar 
[https://perma.cc/R758-NXS6] (“[T]he Supreme Court has largely foreclosed arguments for trial by 
statistics in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.”). But see, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 
1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit [class] certification based on the use 
of extrapolation to calculate damages”). 
 12 Tyson,136 S. Ct. at 1048.  
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introduced and on ‘the elements of the underlying cause of action.’”13 With 
that dicta, the Court resisted the urgings of the Tyson parties and their 
respective amici to adopt “broad and categorical rules governing the use of 
representative and statistical evidence in class actions.”14 As the Court 
explained: 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. at 1046 (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011)). 
The Tyson Court did not elucidate what it meant by “the purpose for which the [statistical] 
evidence is being introduced.” The results of sampling are often admitted into evidence in various 
legal contexts. See, e.g., 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 479, 483–86 (2015–16 ed.) (discussing uses of sampling 
surveys in cases involving, among others, employment discrimination, juror bias, obscenity, and 
trademark litigation); 2 JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 483–528 (1988) (discussing uses of sampling in cases involving, among others, false 
labeling and gender-based equal protection). By way of examples only, statistical evidence, and 
more particularly sampling evidence, is frequently introduced to prove “likelihood of confusion” 
in trademark infringement cases, see 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 23:1–23:11.50 (4th ed. 2010); “disparate impact” in Title VII (42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–2000e-17) cases, see GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79–89 (3d ed. 2010); and antitrust 
damages, see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 116 & n.11 
(1969). See generally Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 
297, 299–303 (2011). As one commentator suggested, “broadly interpreted,” Tyson “stands for the 
proposition that sampling can be used to overcome any serious proof obstacle that systematically 
deprives a large number of injured parties of compensation, impedes enforcement of the 
substantive law, and leaves the defendant free to retain the benefits of its unlawful conduct—
provided, of course, that sampling is otherwise consistent with the applicable substantive law.” 
Robert Bone, Tyson Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication, 95 N.C. L. REV. 607, 636 
(2017).  
 The Tyson Court also did not explain its quotation from Erica P. John Fund—“the elements 
of the underlying cause of action.” The sole dispute in Erica P. John Fund was whether plaintiff 
satisfied the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). The Court stated “[c]onsidering” 
predominance “begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Erica P. 
John Fund, 563 U.S. at 809. There, plaintiff’s claims were based on alleged violations of section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). Id. at 809–10. Whether common questions of 
law or fact predominated turned on, as it often does in securities fraud actions, the element of 
reliance. The narrow question presented for review by the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff 
needed to establish “loss causation as a precondition for invoking Basic’s [“fraud-on-the-market”] 
rebuttable presumption of reliance.” Id. at 812; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring plaintiff to make this showing as 
a precondition of class certification. Erica P. John Fund, 563 U.S. at 813. In short, the Court ruled 
that an inability to prove “loss causation” does not prevent a plaintiff from invoking the “fraud-on-
the-market” rebuttable presumption of reliance as evidence to satisfy that “element[] of the 
underlying cause of action.” Id. at 809. Taken together, Tyson and Erica P. John Fund teach that 
introducing statistical evidence to prove one or more elements of class claims will not only 
support the admissibility of that evidence, but also undergird the satisfaction of the predominance 
prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). 
 14 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1040. The death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016, 
undoubtedly influences the jurisprudence of the current sharply-divided Supreme Court. Justice 
Scalia heard oral argument in Tyson on November 10, 2015, but died before the opinion was 
issued on March 22, 2016. He was an avowed proponent of curtailing class actions, as evidenced 
by his authorship of the majority opinions in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), Wal-
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A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means 
to establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not 
on the form a proceeding takes—be it a class or individual action—
but on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or 
disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action.15 
A comparison of Wal-Mart and Tyson illuminates the superficial 
inconsistency of the Court’s two decisions. However, in Tyson, the Court 
attempted to harmonize them. 
A. Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
The “crux” of the Wal-Mart case is “commonality.”16 The Wal-Mart 
Court found that the only corporate policy established by plaintiffs’ evidence 
was “Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of allowing discretion by local supervisors over 
employment matters. . . . just the opposite of a uniform employment practice 
that would provide the commonality needed for a class action . . . .”17 
In Wal-Mart, a majority of the Court rejected regression analyses 
performed by plaintiffs’ expert statistician and expert labor economist. It 
found that the regional and national data used by the experts “does not 
establish the existence of disparities at individual stores, let alone raise the 
inference that a company-wide policy of discrimination is implemented by 
discretionary decisions at the store and district level.”18 The Wal-Mart Court 
also identified a “more fundamental . . . respect in which [plaintiffs’] 
statistical proof fails.”19 It found that the “nature and effects” of Wal-Mart 
managers’ applying “performance-based criteria . . . will differ from store to 
store,” and ruled that “[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion 
has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.”20 
Plaintiffs in Wal-Mart proposed to select a sample set of class members 
and to determine liability and damages for those members by depositions 
                                                                                                                           
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011). 
 15 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 702). As will be discussed, 
reliability is paramount when considering the admissibility of “[a] representative or statistical 
sample.” See infra note 190 and accompanying text and Part IV. 
 16 564 U.S. at 349; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (“[T]here are questions of law or fact common 
to the class . . . .”). 
 17 564 U.S. at 355. 
 18 Id. at 356–57 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Ikuta, J., dissenting), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)). 
 19 Id. at 357. 
 20 Id. The four dissenting justices in Wal-Mart (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) 
contended that plaintiffs’ expert statistician’s regression analyses showed that there were 
disparities within stores, not just at the regional and national level, and that the majority’s contrary 
view “reflect[ed] only an arcane disagreement about statistical method.” Id. at 372 n.5 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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supervised by a master.21 Under their proposal, classwide aggregate damages 
would be derived by taking the “percentage of claims determined to be valid” 
from the sample and applying that percentage to non-sample class members, 
and then multiplying the “number of (presumptively) valid claims” by the 
average damages in the sample.22 The Wal-Mart Court found that plaintiffs’ 
proposed statistical evidence would not tend to prove classwide claims and 
held that this “Trial by Formula” violated the Rules Enabling Act because it 
“enlarge[d]” the class members’ “substantive right[s]” and deprived Wal-Mart 
of its right to raise statutory defenses to individual claims.23 
                                                                                                                           
 21 564 U.S. at 367. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). Responses to arguments against the use of 
statistical evidence in class actions based on the Rules Enabling Act, Article III (federal court 
authority), Seventh Amendment (jury trial right and Reexamination Clause), and Fourteenth 
Amendment (Due Process Clause) are beyond the scope of this article. U.S. CONST. art. III, 
amend. VII, XIV; 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 On April 4, 2016, two weeks after its Tyson decision, the Supreme Court denied a petition for 
a writ of certiorari to review a $188 million class action judgment against Wal-Mart in a 
Pennsylvania wage and hour case. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 A.3d 656, 658 (Pa. 2014), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1512 (2016) (mem.). In that state court trial, plaintiffs’ experts 
extrapolated sample evidence to calculate classwide aggregate damages. Id. at 661–62. Despite 
Wal-Mart’s contention that this “Trial by Formula” violated its constitutional rights and was 
proscribed by Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court declined to review the case without comment. Id. at 
663–67. 
 After Wal-Mart, several federal courts latched on to the “Trial by Formula” rubric and 
disapproved sampling methodologies to prove classwide liability or damages. See, e.g., Jimenez v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming bifurcated class action order 
because “statistical sampling and representative testimony are acceptable ways to determine 
liability so long as the use of these techniques is not expanded into the realm of damages”); Davis 
v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2013) (characterizing sampling method used as 
“worse than the system that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected in” Wal-Mart and rejecting 
“‘shortfall-based’ model” to order hiring of randomly selected class members and to calculate 
aggregate damages that would be distributed to eligible class members pro rata); In re Elec. Books 
Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293-DLC, 2014 WL 1282293, at *22–23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) 
(describing Wal-Mart “Trial by Formula” as “a plan to try a sample set of class members’ 
claims . . . and then multiply the average backpay award to determine the class-wide recovery 
without further individualized proceedings”); Slipchenko v. Brunel Energy, Inc., No. H-11-1465-
LHR, 2013 WL 4677918, at *10 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (distinguishing Wal-Mart “Trial 
by Formula” because plaintiffs did “not propose[] a sampling-based method to determine 
penalties”); Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 588–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (bifurcating 
liability and damages issues and partially decertifying damages issues of Rule 23(b)(3) class due 
to sampling concerns); Acosta v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 8:08 CV 86-JFB, 2013 WL 7849473, at 
*18 (D. Neb. May 31, 2013) (“Although a ‘trial by formula,’ wherein damages are determined for 
a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class ‘without 
further individualized proceedings,’ has been disapproved, that disapproval cannot fairly be 
interpreted to apply to the use of representative testimony in a class action for unpaid wages.” 
(quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367)), order clarified 2013 WL 3716445 (July 12, 2013); George 
v. Nat’l Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 168, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2012) (contrasting “Trial by 
Formula” because plaintiffs alleged defendant’s “wage policies facially violated state law” and 
remedy only “involves reconstructing the correct wage algorithm,” and noting “defendants are 
entitled to any additional proceedings required to ensure that their due process rights are 
protected” (citations omitted)); Stone v. Advance Am., 278 F.R.D. 562, 566 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2011) 
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At bottom, the putative Wal-Mart class failed to meet the commonality 
prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2) because plaintiffs did not prove that each class 
member was subjected to a common policy of discrimination.24 
B. Tyson v. Bouaphakeo 
In Tyson, plaintiffs relied on “representative evidence,” including class 
members’ testimony, videotaped observations of certain employees’ activities, 
and “most important, a study performed by an industrial relations expert.”25 
Based on the videotaped observations, plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert 
calculated average times for the observed employees to perform the disputed 
activities, “donning” and “doffing” safety gear.26 Another plaintiffs’ expert 
extrapolated those averages to all class members and, by using Tyson 
company time records, estimated the number of class members who had 
viable claims (that is, those who worked more than forty hours in one or more 
                                                                                                                           
(stating that Wal-Mart “largely eliminates a ‘trial by formula’ approach to use statistics to 
extrapolate average damages for an entire class”); United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 
22, 38–39 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting methodology for distributing aggregate damages 
because it “resembles the method the Supreme Court termed ‘Trial by Formula’”).  
 At least one Circuit Court has arguably narrowed the scope of Wal-Mart. See Jimenez, 765 
F.3d at 1167. In Jimenez, the Ninth Circuit opined that the Wal-Mart Court “relied on two key 
factors,” namely that the holding was made “under Rule 23(b)(2), which contains fewer 
procedural safeguards than Rule 23(b)(3) [e.g., opt-out],” and Title VII “which explicitly includes 
affirmative defenses relating to motive and alternative explanations.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 
suggested that these “two key factors” limit the Wal-Mart holding. See id. 
 24 564 U.S. at 359. The conventional wisdom is that Wal-Mart makes it more difficult to 
satisfy the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2). See, e.g., Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 
895, 903 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting “Wal-Mart’s heightened requirement of commonality”); M.D. ex 
rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Wal-Mart decision has 
heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) . . . .”); Christine P. 
Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743, 772 
(2015) (stating that Wal-Mart “heightened the [commonality] requirement”); Elizabeth Chamblee 
Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1863–64 (2015) (“Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard under Rule 23(a) . . . .”). Class certification 
orders filed after Tyson appear to confirm the conventional wisdom. See, e.g., Dilts v. Penske 
Logistics, LLC, No. 08-CV-0318-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 4072485, at *3–6 & n.1 (S.D. Cal. July 
20, 2016) (decertifying certain subclasses and rejecting plaintiff’s proposal to call forty random 
absent class members to testify at trial and to extrapolate from that testimony); Brown v. United 
States, 126 Fed. Cl. 571, 580–81 (2016). 
 25 136 S. Ct. at 1043. Plaintiffs’ claims were based on alleged violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (“FLSA”). 
“Representative evidence” and “representative testimony” are terms of art in FLSA actions that 
refer to evidence regarding selected employees that support findings for all “similarly situated” 
employees. See, e.g., Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 815 F.3d 1000, 1018, 1020–22 (6th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, vacated, 137 S. Ct. 590 (2016) (judgment vacated, and case remanded “in light of” 
Tyson). Cf. Espenscheid v. DirectStat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding no 
“representative evidence”). 
 26 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1043. Pre-Tyson, class plaintiffs relied on similar studies in Garcia v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2014), and Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 
650 F.3d 350, 370–72 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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weeks) and the aggregate amount of class damages.27 That expert’s 
“calculations supported an aggregate [damages] award of approximately $6.7 
million.”28 The jury awarded about $2.9 million in damages.29 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44. 
 28 Id. at 1044. The Tyson Court noted that Tyson “did not raise a challenge to [plaintiffs’] 
experts’ methodology under Daubert; and, as a result, there is no basis in the record to conclude it 
was legal error to admit that evidence.” Id. at 1049. The Court emphasized that, once admitted, the 
“persuasiveness” of evidence “is, in general, a matter for the jury” and “[r]esolving” whether 
plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert’s average times “is probative as to the time actually worked 
by each employee” “is the near-exclusive province of the jury.” Id. 
 It is curious that Tyson neither challenged the validity of plaintiffs’ experts’ studies under 
Daubert nor introduced rebuttal expert testimony, id. at 1044, 1049, despite the fact that it listed 
an expert witness that it expected to call at trial, Def.’s Mem. Supporting Exclusion of Any 
Reference to Dr. Paul Adams, or His Ops., at Trial at 2–3, Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 
F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Iowa 2008). Tyson’s “primary defense was to show that [plaintiffs’ 
industrial relations expert’s] study was unrepresentative or inaccurate.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
In opposing class certification and to the jury, Tyson argued, unsuccessfully, that plaintiffs’ 
expert’s calculated average times were overstated and that the varying amounts of time that the 
observed employees performed the disputed activities made the claims “too speculative for 
classwide recovery.” Id. at 1044, 1047; see Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious 
Case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 2016 CATO S. CT. REV. 279. The fact that Tyson did not 
object to plaintiffs’ expert evidence precluded Tyson from arguing that it was not admissible, but 
it did not prevent Tyson from arguing that the “evidence failed ‘to show that the case is 
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.’” Comcast, 569 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting 
question presented for review in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 567 U.S. 933 (2012)). 
 29 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1044. At Tyson’s request, the jury was instructed that non-testifying 
class members could recover only if the evidence established that they “suffered the same harm as 
a result of the same unlawful decision or policy” as the testifying class members. Id. (citing J.A. at 
101, 471–72, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Aug. 7, 2015)). The trial court also 
adopted Tyson’s proposed jury verdict form calling for an aggregate damages award. Brief for 
Respondents at 20, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 Tyson originally argued that class certification was proper only if plaintiffs established that 
all putative class members had valid claims, but it abandoned that argument in favor of a narrower 
challenge to the distribution of the aggregate damages awarded by the jury. Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 
1049. The Tyson Court did not address damages issues. However, in his concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice John Roberts stated that, based on the jury’s damages award, the “jury obviously did not 
credit [plaintiffs’ industrial relations expert’s] averages” and he stated further that he is “not 
convinced that the District Court will be able to devise a means of distributing the aggregate 
award only to injured class members.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see 
id. at 1044 (demonstrating that it was undisputed that over 200 class members did not have valid 
claims). If not, according to Chief Justice Roberts, “it remains to be seen whether the jury verdict 
can stand” because “Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief to any 
uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.” Id. at 1053. 
 After remand, in an October 6, 2016, Order regarding the distribution of classwide aggregate 
damages, the trial court noted that the Tyson “parties agreed to . . . ‘filters’ in order to ensure 
uninjured individuals do not receive any of the jury’s aggregate award.” Bouaphakeo v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2016 WL 5868081, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 6, 2016). First, 
workers who did not “reach 40 hours in a week without the aid of” plaintiffs’ industrial relations 
expert’s “donning” and “doffing” times estimates were “excluded from the award.” Id. Second, 
only workers who are “owed at least $50” after adding those estimates will share in the award. Id. 
According to the trial court, this “‘buffer zone’ further ensures that uninjured individuals will not 
receive damages by withholding damages from lesser-injured parties.” Id. As a result, 199 workers 
“are not uninjured, rather, they are exempt from the award by agreement of the parties.” Id. 
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The Tyson Court ruled that one way to show that a sample is a 
“permissible method of proving classwide liability is by showing that each 
class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability . . . [in] an 
individual action.”30 The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ expert’s study was 
admissible and “could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding . . . if it 
were introduced in each employee’s individual action.”31 Moreover, as the 
Court pointed out, “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only 
practicable means to collect and present relevant data’ establishing a 
defendant’s liability.”32 
                                                                                                                           
“Finally, by choosing to award any damages in light of the jury instructions regarding 
compensation of uninjured parties, the jury reinforced the ‘injured’ status of the class members.” 
Id. 
 On July 11, 2017, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Settlement of All Contested Issues 
Between the Parties and Joint Request to Vacate Current Court Deadlines for Plaintiffs to File 
Supplements to Their Petition for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs, by which the parties 
notified the trial court that, among other things, they had “establish[ed] a process involving a 
third-party settlement administrator, . . . , to disburse all payments to the Class Members from the 
aggregate jury award in a manner consistent with this Court’s Order of October 6, 2016.” 
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07–cv–04009–JAJ (N.D. Iowa July 11, 2017), ECF No. 
432. 
 30 136 S. Ct at 1046. The Court unanimously shared this view; see also id. at 1050 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring); id. at 1053 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Cf. Davenport v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 
Case No. 4:12 CV 00007 AGF, 2017 WL 878029, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2017) (finding a 
“lack of evidence of a common policy” and therefore “little role for representative evidence”); 
Angeles v. US Airways, Inc., No. C 12 -05860 CRB, 2017 WL 587658, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 
2017) (“Representative evidence would not fly for individual [class members] and it will not fly 
for a class of them.”). 
 31 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 32 Id. at 1046 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2004)). 
The 2015 edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation expands on this point: “Statistical methods 
can often estimate, to specified levels of accuracy, the characteristics of a ‘population’ . . . by 
observing those characteristics in a relatively small segment, or sample, of the population.” 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2015). In the Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence published by the Federal Judicial Center, the Reference Guide on Statistics 
begins: “Statistical assessments are prominent in many kinds of legal cases, including antitrust, 
employment discrimination, toxic torts, and voting rights cases.” David H. Kaye & David A. 
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 
213 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Guide on Statistics].  
 As the Brief of Amici Curiae Complex Litigation Law Professors in Tyson highlighted: 
“Statistical techniques and similar approaches that rely upon a sample are an appropriate way to 
determine common issues of liability in a variety of settings, including antitrust, securities fraud, 
and employment discrimination litigation. In all of these settings statistical techniques have been 
especially useful at the class certification stage to determine whether the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been satisfied.” Brief for Complex Litigation Law Professors as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–5, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 
(Sept. 29, 2015) (citing, inter alia, Comcast, 569 U.S. at 31–32) (antitrust); Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (securities fraud); Messner v. Northshore 
Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2012) (antitrust); In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) (antitrust); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 300 
(5th Cir. 2000) (employment discrimination); Barnes v. GenCorp. Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (employment discrimination)); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 
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In Tyson, the “central dispute” was whether the “average time” observed 
in the sample could be extrapolated to each member of the population was a 
“permissible” “inference.”33 For this reason, the Court opined that its Tyson 
holding “is in accord with” Wal-Mart because the “underlying question” in 
both cases “was whether the sample at issue could have been used to establish 
liability in an individual action.”34 
                                                                                                                           
§ 23.1, at 469–72 (2004); 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 18:45, at 155–56 (5th ed. 2012). 
 33 136 S. Ct. at 1046. The Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents in Tyson offered this overview: 
Inferential statistics, . . . comprises methods that allow us to use what is known to 
make estimates and predictions about the unknown. All inferential techniques in 
statistics are, in one way or another, based on well-accepted concepts of sampling 
and extrapolation. Sampling refers to the idea that observed information is an 
incomplete, grainy snapshot—a sample—taken from a larger universe of potentially 
observable information, called the population. Extrapolation means that this sample, 
although incomplete, can still be reliably informative about the population from 
which it is obtained. . . . 
 Good statistical practice calls for data collection procedures that minimize the 
risk of unrepresentative sampling, analytical tools appropriate to deal with a given 
sample, and trained interpretation that recognizes the potential limitations of both 
data and techniques. 
Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–
8, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Sept. 29, 2015). 
 Among other grounds for criticizing plaintiffs’ experts’ statistical evidence in Tyson, Justice 
Clarence Thomas in dissent objected to the sample size, “about 53,” that was used “to extrapolate 
averages for the 3,344-person class.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While 
discussing Wal-Mart, Justice Thomas alluded to the “1:8 ratio of anecdotes [samples] to class 
members that our prior cases accepted.” Id. at 1060 (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 358); see also 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977). 
 34 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. Some courts and commentators believe that the Tyson Court’s 
decision to accept “representative evidence” can be explained by, and therefore should be limited 
to, its substantive law context. As previously noted, in Tyson, plaintiffs’ claims were based on 
alleged violations of the FLSA. See supra note 25. The FLSA requires employers, such as Tyson, 
to “make, keep, and preserve” employee wage and hour records. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012). More 
than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 
(1946), held that when an employer violates its FLSA statutory duty to keep proper records, and 
employees thereby have no way to establish the time spent doing uncompensated work, “an 
employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he 
was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and 
extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 687. “The burden then 
shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or 
with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s 
evidence.” Id. at 687–88. Following and applying the evidentiary burden-shifting procedure 
approved in Mt. Clemens, the Tyson Court found that plaintiffs “sought to introduce a 
representative sample to fill an evidentiary gap created by [Tyson’s] failure to keep adequate 
records.” Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. “Courts have frequently granted back wages under the FLSA 
to non-testifying employees based upon the representative testimony of a small percentage of the 
employees.” Donavan v. Bel-Loc Diner, Inc., 780 F.2d 1113, 1116 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on 
other grounds by McLaughlin v. Richard Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988); see Morgan v. Family 
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases); cf. Day v. Celadon 
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Plaintiffs in both Wal-Mart and Tyson proposed to use sampling 
evidence to prove classwide liability and damages, but both Supreme Court 
decisions were limited to classwide liability issues. Because the aggregate 
damages awarded at the Tyson trial had not been disbursed, and the record at 
the Supreme Court did not indicate how they would be disbursed, the Tyson 
Court deemed any consideration of damages issues premature.35 Thus, the 
Supreme Court did not in Tyson, and has not to date, provided any specific 
guidance regarding the permissible use of sampling evidence to prove 
aggregate damages or individual damages in class actions.36 
C. Harmonizing Wal-Mart and Tyson 
At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile the Wal-Mart and Tyson 
decisions. The salient facts are similar. In both cases, the putative class 
members’ damages claims were too small to make separate adjudications 
feasible (“negative value cases”), and therefore the only realistic way for 
them to obtain relief was through a class action (or other aggregation 
procedure). In both cases, plaintiffs offered a sample average to determine 
aggregate damages. 
The Tyson Court distinguished Wal-Mart by contrasting the 
heterogeneity of the two proposed classes: “While the experiences of the 
employees in Wal-Mart bore little relationship to one another, in this [Tyson] 
case each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was 
paid under the same policy.”37 The Tyson Court characterized the “underlying 
question” in both cases as “whether the sample at issue could have been used 
                                                                                                                           
Trucking Servs., Inc., No. 15-1711, 2016 WL 3606682, at *8 (8th Cir. July 5, 2016) (applying Mt. 
Clemens evidentiary burden-shifting procedure in a Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (“WARN”) Act case). Compare Atis v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 15-3424-RBK-
JS, 2016 WL 7440465, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2016) (finding Tyson inapposite because the 
employer “had no statutory duty to track the hours worked” by exempt employees), with 
Ridgeway v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-cv-05221-SI, 2017 WL 363214, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
25, 2017) (stating a jury accepting “representative sampling [figures] used to reach an average 
amount of time spent on a certain activity was approved by the Supreme Court in Tyson”). 
 Justice Thomas reads Mt. Clemens even more narrowly, concluding that “[a]ll Mt. Clemens 
decided was that the lack of precise data about the amount of time each employee worked was not 
fatal to their case,” and that its holding is limited “to instances where the employer’s FLSA 
violation was ‘certain.’” 136 S. Ct. at 1057–59 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mt. Clemens, 328 
U.S. at 688). 
 35 136 S. Ct. at 1049–50; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 36 See Bone, supra note 13, at 632 (opining that Tyson “opens the door to broader use of 
sampling but provides little guidance to lower court judges, who must decide when and how to use 
it”); Note, Civil Procedure—Representative Evidence—Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 407, 411 (2016) (“Though the Court reached a sound conclusion on the 
admissibility question, it failed to guide trial judges on how to handle representative studies going 
forward.”); id. at 416 (“Trial judges would have benefited from some discussion of managing 
statistical evidence when it is admissible.”). 
 37 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359. 
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to establish liability in an individual action,” and, because the Wal-Mart 
putative class members were not “similarly situated,” the Court stated that 
there “would be little or no role for representative evidence” in any individual 
adjudication in that case.38 The Tyson Court concluded: “Permitting the use of 
that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated the Rules 
Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class 
proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action.”39 In short, 
plaintiffs’ sampling evidence was rejected in Wal-Mart because “the sample 
chosen was [not] representative of [the] population.”40 
As the Wal-Mart Court itself stated, the “crux” of the Wal-Mart case is 
“commonality,” that is, whether each class member suffered from a common 
corporate policy of discrimination.41 It is therefore a stretch to intimate that 
the “underlying question” in that case “was whether the sample at issue could 
have been used to establish liability in an individual action.”42 
However, Wal-Mart and Tyson can be harmonized. The principal 
learning of Wal-Mart, as interpreted by the Tyson Court, is that the 
admissibility of sampling evidence, “like all evidence,” “turns . . . on the 
degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements 
of the relevant cause of action.”43 Thus, there is no reason why reliable 
sampling evidence may not be introduced to prove both classwide liability 
and classwide damages, including individual damages. 
In this Article, we focus on proving the element of classwide damages, 
and more particularly class members’ individual damages, and satisfying the 
predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3). As we discuss, to be admissible, 
sampling evidence must be relevant and reliable and satisfy Daubert and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 standards. One avenue to admissibility is to 
demonstrate that an individual class member could rely on the sampling 
evidence to prove liability or damages in an individual action, a proposition 
endorsed by the entire Tyson Court.44 Before exploring each of these topics, 
we offer a brief history of attempts to use sampling evidence in class actions 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 39 Id. 
 40 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 103 (2004); see Wal-Mart, 
564 U.S. at 357. The sampling evidence in Wal-Mart was also rejected because it purportedly 
would deprive Wal-Mart of its right “to litigate its [Title VII] statutory defenses to individual 
claims.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367. Rejecting sampling evidence because it is not representative 
is logical. But, the latter proposition is a non sequitur. The Tyson Court did not explain how class 
heterogeneity detrimentally affects a class defendant’s right to interpose statutory defenses to 
individual claims. 
 41 564 U.S. at 349. 
 42 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 43 Id. at 1046 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 702); see Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 
389, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Tyson did not create a rule limiting representative evidence beyond the 
well-established standards of admissibility.”). 
 44 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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before Wal-Mart and Tyson, which may help to explain the prior judicial 
reluctance to accept it.45 
D. Brief Bleak History of Sampling Evidence in  
Federal Court Class Actions 
Even before Wal-Mart and the Supreme Court’s condemnation of “Trial 
by Formula,” few federal courts embraced sampling evidence to determine 
classwide issues. Judicial reluctance to admit such evidence is explained, at 
least in part, not by any fault with this statistical methodology, but with its 
improper application.46 A brief history is illuminating. The leading federal 
court cases before Wal-Mart and Tyson are discussed immediately below. 
1. Cimino v. Raymark Industries 
The tortuous history of mass tort asbestos litigation in the Eastern 
District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit is emblematic of the difficulties that 
trial courts face attempting to efficiently and fairly manage class action 
claims by using sampling. The “odyssey” began in 1986 when District Judge 
Robert M. Parker certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class for the trial of certain 
common issues, including the viability of the “state of the art” defense 
interposed by defendant asbestos manufacturers.47 After an interlocutory 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed District Judge Parker’s order to certify the 
Rule 23(b)(3) class.48 
District Judge Parker then issued pre-trial orders, consolidating over 
3,000 personal injury cases for a single jury trial on the “state of the art” 
defense and punitive damages issues, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), and 
certifying a class “for the remaining issues of exposure and actual damages,” 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).49 The trial was planned to proceed in 
three phases. Phase I would follow the procedure approved in Jenkins to 
decide the “state of the art” defense and punitive damages issues.50 Phase II, 
before the same jury, would include a full trial of liability and damages for the 
eleven class representatives, with additional evidence from thirty illustrative 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See infra notes 46–81 and accompanying text. 
 46 There is ample guidance about the proper use of statistics. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET 
AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 4–7 (5th ed. 2012); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: 
EXPERT EVIDENCE §§ 12.1–12.10 (2014); JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS 
ACTIONS §§ 8:6–8:13 (14th ed. 2017); 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS §§ 11:1–11:21 (5th ed. 2014); Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 211–302. 
 47 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470–71 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing viability 
of “state of the art” defense); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 
1990), rev’d in part, vacated in part by 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (describing asbestos 
litigation as an “odyssey”). 
 48 Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 475. 
 49 In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 50 Id. 
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class members, fifteen selected by plaintiffs and fifteen selected by 
defendants.51 In this Phase, the jury would hear expert evidence and 
determine aggregate damages for each subclass.52 Finally, in Phase III, “any 
awarded damages [would] be distributed utilizing various techniques.”53 
While “encourag[ing] the district court to continue its imaginative and 
innovative efforts to confront these cases,”54 the Fifth Circuit vacated the 
order for the Phase II trial, and the associated Rule 23(b)(3) class certification 
order, because, among other things, “[t]here are too many disparities [e.g., 
different diseases, product identification, manners and degrees of exposure, 
lifestyle differences] . . . for their common concerns to predominate.”55 
On remand, the case proceeded as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action jury trial: 
Phase I on the issues of liability and punitive damages and “complete cases of 
ten class representatives.”56 “After an eight week trial, the jury found for the  
[p]laintiffs and awarded nine of the class representatives approximately $3.5 
million in actual damages.”57 The jury also found defendant asbestos 
manufacturers grossly negligent and assessed punitive damages.58 The need 
for Phase II was obviated when the parties stipulated to asbestos “exposure” 
issues.59 
To resolve damages issues, in Phase III, almost 2,300 class members 
were divided into five disease categories (i.e., subclasses) based on plaintiffs’ 
injury claims.60 District Judge Parker selected a random sample of class 
members from each category for trial before a jury.61 He ruled that “[e]ach 
plaintiff whose damage case was submitted to the jury is to be awarded his 
individual verdict and the average verdict for each disease category will 
constitute the damage award for each non-sample class member.”62 The 
claims of the randomly selected 160 class members were tried over 133 
days.63 District Judge Parker ordered that each of the more than 2,100 
remaining class members (“extrapolation cases”) would be entitled to 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. at 709. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 707. 
 54 Id. at 712. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Cimino v. Raymark Indus, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328, 329 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 57 Id. at 330. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 654. 
 60 Id. at 653; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into 
subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”). 
 61 Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. 
 62 Id. Plaintiffs agreed to this procedure, waiving their rights to individual damages 
determinations. See id.; Cimino, 739 F. Supp. at 329. 
 63 Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. According to District Judge Parker, Phase III “utilizes the 
science of statistics, or more specifically, inferential statistics.” Id. at 659. 
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individual damages equal to the average of the verdicts in the sample cases in 
the same disease category.64 
Almost eight years after the trials, the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
judgments entered in the Phase III sample cases as well as the “extrapolation 
cases,” holding that, under the governing law of Texas, “causation must be 
determined as to individuals, not groups,” and that defendants had Seventh 
Amendment rights to have a jury make that determination.65 
2. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos 
During the protracted interval between the trial court judgments in 
Cimino and their reversal by the Fifth Circuit, the District of Hawaii used 
inferential statistics to calculate individual damages for over 9,500 Rule 
23(b)(3) class members in a class action against the Estate of Ferdinand 
Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines, based on alleged violations of 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. at 664–65; Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 65 Cimino, 151 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, the Fifth Circuit 
also observed that none of plaintiffs’ experts “purported to say that the damages suffered by the 
phase III plaintiffs in a given disease category (whether as disclosed by the phase III evidence or 
as found by the jury) were to any extent representative of the damages suffered by the 
extrapolation plaintiffs in the same disease category.” Id. at 320–21 nn.23–25, 48. 
 The three-judge Fifth Circuit panel in Cimino (Garza, Garwood and Davis, JJ.) distinguished 
the opinion and decision of another panel (Jones, DeMoss and Parker, JJ.) in In re Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997), which had been issued during the almost eight-year 
hiatus between the federal district court sample trials and the issuance of the appellate decision in 
Cimino. Interestingly, In re Chevron was authored by then Circuit Judge Robert M. Parker, who 
had ordered and presided over the Cimino trials as a federal district court judge before his 
elevation to the Circuit Court. 
 In re Chevron involved claims by approximately 3,000 neighboring property owners for 
personal injuries and property damage allegedly caused by contamination from Chevron’s 
abandoned crude oil storage waste pit. 109 F.3d at 1017. The trial court directed that thirty 
individuals be chosen, fifteen by plaintiffs and fifteen by defendants, and that there be “a unitary 
trial on the issues of ‘general liability or causation’ on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs, as well as 
the individual causation and damage issues of the [thirty] selected plaintiffs.” Id. If the “unitary 
trial” established that Chevron was responsible for the “pollutants that, allegedly, give rise to all of 
the plaintiffs’ claims,” then individual causation and damages issues for the unchosen claimants 
would be determined subsequently at separate trials. Id. at 1019. 
 The In re Chevron Court (per Parker, J.) found that the thirty selected claimants were neither 
shown, nor chosen, to be representative of the other claimants, and opined that “[a] bellwether trial 
designed to achieve its value ascertainment function for settlement purposes or to answer 
troubling causation or liability issues common to the universe of claimants has as a core element 
representativeness.” Id. For a discussion of “bellwether” trials, see infra note 197 and 
accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit granted Chevron’s petition for mandamus prohibiting 
“utilization of the results obtained from the trial of the thirty (30) selected cases for any purpose 
affecting issues or claims of, or defenses to, the remaining untried cases.” Id. at 1021.  
 Later in its appellate decision in Cimino, the Fifth Circuit described the language in Circuit 
Judge Parker’s opinion “generally looking with favor on the use of bellwether verdicts when 
shown to be statistically representative,” see In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019–20, as “plainly 
dicta . . . insofar as it might suggest that representative bellwether verdicts could properly be used 
to determine individual causation and damages for other plaintiffs.” Cimino, 151 F.3d at 318. 
672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:655 
the Alien Tort Statute and the Tort Victim Protection Act.66 The federal 
district court segregated the trial into three phases: liability, exemplary 
damages, and compensatory damages.67 After finding liability and awarding 
exemplary damages, in the compensatory damages phase of the trial, the trial 
court “allowed the jury to consider” the “damages sustained by a random 
sample of plaintiffs as representative of damages suffered by the entire 
class.”68 The Special Master appointed by the trial court reviewed the 
depositions of 137 randomly selected claimants.69 He reported to the jury 
“recommending the damages suffered by the 137 claimants, to give the jury a 
statistically valid representation of damages suffered by the entire class.”70 
The trial court cited and followed District Judge Parker’s trial plan in Cimino 
as “precedent,” dividing the class members into three subclasses based upon 
each plaintiff’s claims, and selecting a random sample from the class 
population.71 Each plaintiff who was a member of the random sample, and 
who had a valid claim, was awarded individual damages.72 The average 
verdict for each subclass was awarded to the non-sample class members.73 
On appeal, the Estate’s challenge to the trial procedure adopted by the 
trial court was “very narrow”: “[i]t challenges specifically only ‘the method 
by which [the district court] allowed the validity of the class claims to be 
determined’: the master’s use of a representative sample to determine what 
percentage of the total claims were invalid.”74 To the Ninth Circuit, the 
grounds for the Estate’s “challenges” were “unclear” and “poorly presented,” 
but, still, the “Estate’s due-process claim does raise serious questions.”75 
Applying the due process balancing test set forth in Connecticut v. Doehr76 
and Matthews v. Eldridge,77 the Ninth Circuit weighed the Estate’s “only 
interest,” the “total amount of damages for which it will be liable,” with the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 
1995); see Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 67 In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1462. 
 68 Id. at 1462, 1464. 
 69 Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 706 (Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses). 
 70 In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1464. It is noteworthy that defendant Estate “did not appear 
at any of the depositions” or “depose any of the . . . class members to test the procedure employed 
by the Court, or to acquire evidence to refute the fairness to the defendant of this random selection 
process using inferential statistical methodology.” Id. at 1465. 
 71 Id. at 1467. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784 (9th Cir. 1996) (alteration in the original). 
The Ninth Circuit stated that District Judge Parker’s opinion in Cimino “apparently helped 
persuade the district court [of Hawaii] to use this method.” Id.; see Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 659–
67. 
 75 Hilao, 103 F.3d at 784–85. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
In re Fibreboard Corp. on the ground that it was based on Texas substantive law. Id.; see In re 
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 76 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991). 
 77 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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class members’ “enormous” interest in the sampling methodology, “since 
adversarial resolution of each class member’s claim would pose 
insurmountable practical hurdles,” and with the judiciary’s “‘ancillary’ 
interest” in avoiding “individual adversarial determinations of claim validity 
[that] would clog the docket of the district court for years.”78 It held that the 
trial court’s “unorthodox” statistical “methodology in determining valid 
claims” passed due process muster.79 
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit’s Hilao decision pre-dated the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Cimino, which rejected District Judge Parker’s trial plan 
that had “persuad[ed]” the District of Hawaii to use a sampling 
methodology.80 Moreover, it is doubtful that the vitality of the Hilao sampling 
methodology survives Wal-Mart.81 
Suffice it to say, the sampling methodologies proposed in Cimino and 
Hilao did not present sampling evidence in its best light. Tyson may represent 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Hilao, 103 F.3d at 786–87. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Cimino 151 F.3d at 297; Hilao 103 F.3d at 767. Another case that raised statistical 
evidence issues is Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 
198 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d. in part, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, plaintiffs’ experts 
used a random sample of subscriber depositions “to extrapolate statistically meaningful inferences 
about the plaintiff subscriber population as a whole” and “statistical evidence about the effect of 
the defendants’ misleading statements on smoking behavior.” Id. at 226–28. 
 On appeal, the Second Circuit found “without merit” defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs’ 
reliance on “aggregate (i.e., statistical) proof of causation and damages” violated their 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process, but certified to the New York Court of 
Appeals the question of whether, under the facts of the case, New York’s consumer protection 
statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349, requires individual proof of harm. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 211, 225–28 (2d Cir. 2003). The New York Court 
of Appeals did not reach that question because it answered in the affirmative another certified 
question: whether the claims of a third-party payer of health care costs, such as Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, were too remote to be recovered derivatively under the statute, thereby mooting the 
certified individual proof of harm question. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 818 N.E. 2d 1140, 1146 (N.Y. 2004). As a result of the New York Court of Appeals 
response to that certified question, the Second Circuit reversed the jury trial verdict on a ground 
that was not related to the expert statistical evidence introduced at trial. Empire Healthchoice, Inc. 
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 Subsequently, in a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class action based on claims under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012), the Second 
Circuit ruled that common issues did not predominate over individual issues of reliance, injury, 
and damages. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). More to the point, 
the court rejected, as violative of the Rules Enabling Act and the Due Process Clause, plaintiffs’ 
“fluid recovery” proposal whereby “defendant’s aggregate liability is determined in a single, 
class-wide adjudication” and “individual class members are afforded an opportunity to collect 
their individual shares, ‘usually through a simplified proof of claim procedure.’” Id. at 231–33. 
The court held that “fluid recovery” could not be used to “mask the prevalence of individual 
issues.” Id. at 232. 
 81 See supra note 23. The Supreme Court’s discussion of “Trial by Formula” in Wal-Mart 
does not refer to Hilao, but the majority noted that the Ninth Circuit approved the trial plan in 
Wal-Mart in reliance on Hilao. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
603 F.3d 571, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
674 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:655 
the advent of a more open-minded view by the Supreme Court toward the 
proper use of sampling evidence in class actions. 
We now turn to the standards governing the admissibility of sampling 
evidence in class actions. 
II. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS CERTIFICATION DISPUTES 
A. Admissibility of Expert Evidence 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals established new standards for 
the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts.82 Further, because a 
decision to grant or deny a motion for class certification is often outcome-
determinative of an entire case, and a class certification ruling is frequently 
based on expert evidence, expert evidence is now de rigueur in class 
certification disputes and Daubert and its progeny are often on center stage.83 
                                                                                                                           
 82 509 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1993) (holding the “general acceptance” test of Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for the admissibility of scientific evidence that had 
been applied by many federal and state courts had been superseded by the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, specifically Rule 702); see ERIC R. HARLAN ET AL., AM. BAR 
ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG. TRIAL EVIDENCE COMM., DAUBERT V. FRYE: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 
OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2016). 
 83 See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 
(2013) (arguing that, in recent years, the ability to bring class action lawsuits has become 
problematic). 
 For a class action defendant, “[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant’s 
potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle 
and to abandon a meritorious defense.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978); 
see Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
97, 99 (2009) (“With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation on a path 
toward resolution by way of settlement . . . .”); see also, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a 
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 
F.3d 1069, 1086–87 & n.19 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulene Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendants facing large classwide damages awards “will be under 
intense pressure to settle”). 
 For a class action plaintiff, “a refusal to certify a class . . . may induce a plaintiff to abandon 
his individual claim.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 470 (discussing interlocutory appeals and 
“death knell” doctrine); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.213, at 40 (2004) 
(“Denial of class certification may effectively end the litigation.”). 
 Note that Coopers & Lybrand was decided before the 1998 adoption of Rule 23(f) 
authorizing discretionary interlocutory appellate review of class certification rulings. Following an 
instruction by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“[t]he courts of appeal will develop 
standards for granting review” under Rule 23(f)), Circuit Courts have established general 
standards to decide whether a class certification ruling warrants interlocutory review. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1998 amendment; see, e.g., Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 
1259, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 
102–06 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
165 (3d Cir. 2001); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 Case studies have suggested that “aggregation of related cases at a very young stage may 
benefit defendants, while aggregation of related cases in an ‘adolescent’ stage (i.e., after plaintiffs 
have achieved early breakthrough victories) may favor plaintiffs. Moreover, experimental studies 
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After Daubert, a federal district court acts as the “gatekeep[er]” to ensure 
that, to be admissible, proffered expert evidence is “not only relevant, but 
reliable.”84 
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”85 “The Rules’ basic standard of 
relevance thus is a liberal one.”86 Relevant evidence is generally 
admissible. 87 Pursuant to Rule 702(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
expert evidence is admissible if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”88 Therefore, expert evidence must 
be based on the facts of the case: “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires 
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to 
admissibility.”89 In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence embody a “liberal 
thrust” and a “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 
‘opinion’ testimony.”90 
To be reliable, the subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific 
knowledge.”91 “‘[S]cientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science,” and “‘knowledge’ . . . .  applies to any body of known 
facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on 
good grounds.”92 To qualify as “scientific knowledge,” therefore, an inference 
based on statistics must be “derived by the scientific method,” and related 
                                                                                                                           
have shown that aggregation helps plaintiffs with weak cases and hurts plaintiffs with strong cases 
in terms of damages, and have generally (though not entirely) pro-plaintiff effects in terms of 
liability.” JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN 
ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (2002) (citations omitted); see BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & 
THOMAS E. WILLIGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET 
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 6 (2005) (finding that 90% of class actions settle); Thomas E. Willging & 
Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference 
Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 606–07 (2006) (noting that, in an empirical study 
of state and federal class actions, “all certified class actions settled on a class-wide basis”). 
 84 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 597; see FED. R. EVID. 401, 702. The trial “court must decide 
any preliminary questions about whether . . . evidence is admissible.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 85 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 86 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
 87 See FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 88 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
 89 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92. In explaining the required relevancy of expert testimony, the 
Daubert Court adopted the characterization of Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker in United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985), and United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784, 
791–92 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985), “as one of ‘fit.’” 509 U.S. at 591. The 
relevancy inquiry is: Does the expert evidence “fit” the case? 
 90 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. 
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
 91 Id. at 589–90.  
 92 Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 
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expert statistical evidence “must be supported by appropriate validation.”93 
This “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”94 
The Daubert Court noted “that scientists typically distinguish between 
‘validity’ (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and 
‘reliability’ (does application of the principle produce consistent results?).”95 
The Court emphasized that it was referring to “evidentiary reliability—that is, 
trustworthiness,” and instructed, “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, 
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”96 
Thus, to discharge its responsibility as “gatekeeper,” a federal district 
court must determine “whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) 
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 590 n.9 (citing Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 595, 599 (1988)). According to the author of the cited article, scientific validity depends on 
the acceptance of the “scientific practice and the soundness and cogency of the entire pattern of 
reasoning leading to the expert’s conclusion.” Black, supra at 600. He continues, “[w]idespread 
consensus and acceptance, therefore, is the central test that scientists use to decide the validity of 
theories and reasoning in any given context, which is a test that the law can adopt and use 
successfully.” Id. at 601 (footnotes omitted). The citation to this article is curious in light of the 
Daubert Court’s rejection of the Frye test. 
 96 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that a federal district court’s “gatekeeper” role encompasses all expert evidence, 
not only “scientific” evidence, pointing out that Rule 702 “makes no relevant distinction between 
‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge,” and “applies its 
reliability standard to all . . . matters within its scope.” 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). As the Supreme 
Court recognized in a decision after Daubert, under Rule 702, all expert evidence must comply 
with “exacting standards of reliability.” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 Compare the Daubert Court’s explanation with the discussion regarding reliability and 
validity of statistics in the Reference Guide on Statistics: 
Reliability and validity are two aspects of accuracy in measurement. In statistics, 
reliability refers to reproducibility of results. A reliable measuring instrument 
returns consistent measurements. . . .  
 Reliability can be ascertained by measuring the same quantity several times; the 
measurements must be made independently to avoid bias. Given independence, the 
correlation coefficient . . . between repeated measurements can be used as a measure 
of reliability. . . . 
 Two different aspects of reliability should be considered. First, the “within-
observer variability” of judgments should be small—the same evaluator should rate 
essentially identical cases in similar ways. Second, the “between-observer 
variability” should be small—different evaluators should rate the same cases in 
essentially the same way. . . . 
 Reliability is necessary but not sufficient to ensure accuracy. In addition to 
reliability, validity is needed. A valid measuring instrument measures what it is 
supposed to. . . . 
 When there is an established way of measuring a variable, a new measurement 
process can be validated by comparison with the established one. . . . A common 
measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor and the 
criterion . . . . 
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (footnotes omitted). 
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determine a fact in issue.”97 As the Daubert Court explained, “[t]his entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”98 “Pertinent 
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those 
demands.”99 
The Daubert Court offered federal courts five non-exclusive factors to 
guide the “flexible” “inquiry envisioned by Rule 702” regarding whether “a 
theory or technique is scientific knowledge.”100 To assess whether a “theory 
or technique” exhibits scientific validity, federal courts should consider: 
“whether it can be (and has been) tested” (“[o]rdinarily, a key question”); 
“whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; “known or 
potential rate of error”; “existence and maintenance of standards controlling 
[its] operation”; and “general acceptance.”101 
In response to Daubert and the many cases applying it, Rule 702 was 
amended in 2000.102 As pointed out by the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, that amendment “provides some general standards that the trial court 
must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert 
testimony.”103 Those mandatory standards are: “the expert’s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; “the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data”; “the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods”; and “the expert has reliably applied the principles 
and methods to the facts of the case.”104 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 98 Id. at 592–93. 
 99 Id. at 597. 
 100 Id. at 593–94. 
 101 Id. at 593–94. In General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, a unanimous Supreme Court held that an 
appellate court should apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a federal district 
court’s Daubert evidentiary ruling to admit or exclude expert testimony, whether or not the ruling 
is “outcome determinative.” 522 U.S. 136, 141–43, 146 (1997). 
 A party will likely have only one chance to pass by the federal district court “gatekeeper.” In 
Weisgram, plaintiff won a jury verdict. The Eighth Circuit, however, held that plaintiff’s expert’s 
testimony was speculative and should have been excluded, and granted judgment as a matter of 
law for defendants. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455. Plaintiff argued that he should have a right to a 
new trial and to introduce additional expert evidence, but the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument: “Since Daubert . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of exacting 
standards of reliability such evidence must meet. . . . It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, 
that parties will initially present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second 
chance should their first try fail.” Id. 
 102 FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 was amended again in 2011: “These changes are intended to 
be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2011 amendment. 
 103 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment (emphasis added). 
 104 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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The Advisory Committee also enumerated factors to add to the Daubert 
Court’s “non-exclusive checklist” that are “relevant in determining whether 
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact,” 
including:  
(1) Whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing 
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted 
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed 
their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. 
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an 
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. 
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious 
alternative explanations. 
(4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in his 
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.  
(5) Whether the field of experience claimed by the expert is known 
to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would 
give.105 
The 2000 amendment to Rule 702 expressly provides that a federal 
district court “must scrutinize not only the principles and methods used by the 
expert, but also whether those principles and methods have been properly 
applied to the facts of the case.”106 
B. Admissibility of Sampling Evidence 
As the 2015 edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) 
succinctly summarizes, when “sampling to generate data about a population 
so the data will be verified or declared true,” “the reliability and validity of 
estimates about the population derived from sampling are critical.”107 
Relevant factors to determine whether “sampling methods . . . conform to 
generally recognized statistical standards” include: “the population was 
properly chosen and defined”; “the sample chosen was representative of that 
                                                                                                                           
 105 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 106 Id. As the Daubert Court made clear, “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles 
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” 509 U.S. at 595. That said, 
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another . . . . [N]othing in either 
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is 
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 
146; see ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp. 696 F.3d 254, 291 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that reliability 
“applies to all aspects of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s 
opinion, [and] the link between the facts and the conclusion” (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 
167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999))). 
 107 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493, at 102 (2015). 
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population”; “the data gathered were accurately reported”; and “the data were 
analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles.”108 Adhering to 
these standards enables the proponent of sampling evidence to convincingly 
argue that the proffered evidence is “scientific knowledge” and “will assist 
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue,” and is, 
consequently, admissible.109 And, as stated in the Reference Guide on 
Statistics: 
Statistical studies suitably designed to address a material issue 
generally will be admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. . . . Because most statistical methods relied on in court 
are described in textbooks or journal articles and are capable of 
producing useful results when properly applied, these methods 
generally satisfy important aspects of the “scientific knowledge” 
requirement in [Daubert]. . . . Of course, a particular study may use 
a method that is entirely appropriate but that is so poorly executed 
that it should be inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 
and 702.110 Or, the method may be inappropriate for the problem at 
hand and thus lack the “fit” spoken of in Daubert. Or the study 
might rest on data of the type not reasonably relied on by 
statisticians or substantive experts and hence run afoul of Federal 
Rules of Evidence 703.111 Often, however, the battle over statistical 
evidence concerns weight or sufficiency rather than 
admissibility.112 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. at 103. 
 109 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The burden is on the proponent of the expert evidence to show 
that it meets all Daubert requirements. Id. 
 110 FED. R. EVID. 403 (internal footnote supplied). The Rule, titled “Excluding Relevant 
Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons,” states: “The court may 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or 
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. 
 111 FED. R. EVID. 703 (internal footnote supplied). The Rule, titled “Bases of an Expert,” 
states: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been 
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would 
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, 
they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data 
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to 
the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
Id. 
 112 Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 214 (original footnotes omitted). 
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C. Generally Accepted Statistical Standards 
An expert statistician can randomly select a sample from a population of 
class members’ damages claims for individual adjudications and estimate the 
average value of the claims. “The precision of an estimate is usually reported 
in terms of the standard error and a confidence interval.”113 
An estimate based on a sample of class members’ damages claims may 
be inaccurate because of random error. The standard error measures the 
“likely magnitude of this random error.”114 The standard deviation measures 
heterogeneity.115 “The less heterogeneity in the values, the smaller the 
standard error.”116 
“Usually, a confidence interval for the population average is centered at 
the sample average; the desired confidence level is obtained by adding and 
subtracting a suitable multiple of the standard error.”117 Many statisticians use 
+/- 1.96 standard errors to arrive at a 95% confidence interval.118 Using this 
heuristic, a statistician who opines that the population average is “within 2 
standard errors” of the sample average will be correct about 95% of the 
time.119 
In a sampling study, it is thus possible that an observation (e.g., 
estimated average value) is due to sampling error.120 An alternative (or 
complement) to using confidence intervals to express the uncertainty of an 
estimate, or to make decisions notwithstanding the uncertainty of an estimate, 
is to use p-values. “The p-value is the probability of getting data as extreme 
as, or more extreme than, the actual data—given that the null hypothesis [or 
default hypothesis, such as ‘no difference’ between two populations] is 
true.”121 If the p-value of the observed result is less than a defined 
significance level, it may be probabilistically concluded that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis.122 
Typically, a significance level of five percent is chosen. Below this threshold, 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. at 241 (footnotes omitted). 
 114 Id. at 243. 
 115 Id. Statisticians distinguish between “the standard error of the sample average, which 
measures the likely size of the random error in the sample average,” and “the standard deviation of 
the sample, which measures the spread in the sample data.” Id. at 243 n.87. 
 116 Id. at 243.  
 117 Id. at 244. 
 118 Id. at 244 n.89. 
 119 Id. at 244. 
 120 See EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 185–226 (13th ed. 2013) 
(discussing survey sampling); VINCENT FLAHERTY, COMPASSIONATE STATISTICS: APPLIED 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 127–38 (2008) (discussing probability and 
statistical significance). 
 121 Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 250. 
 122 See R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 271–316 (3d ed. 2005). 
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the observed result is called “statistically significant,” that is, not due to 
sampling error.123 
Using these generally accepted statistical concepts (standard errors, 
confidence intervals, and p-values) in measuring the accuracy of an estimated 
average value of individual damages claims in a class action would easily 
satisfy the “scientific knowledge” and “fit” requirements of Daubert and 
Rules 702 and 703. However, these concepts do not recommend a 
methodology to follow to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite 
where, as is often the case, individual class member’s damages claims vary. 
Recalling that the Supreme Court distinguished the classes (and 
decisions) in Wal-Mart and Tyson based on the degree of heterogeneity within 
the employee populations, it is clear that the Court was concerned about the 
reliability of the sampling methodologies employed by plaintiffs’ experts in 
both cases. In Wal-Mart, the Court found that the employees were not 
“similarly situated” and, therefore, “none of them could have prevailed in an 
individual suit by relying on” evidence relating to other employees.124 In Wal-
Mart, therefore, “there would be little or no role for representative 
evidence.”125 “In contrast,” the “circumstances” in Tyson (“each employee 
worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same 
policy”) “confirms” that “experiences of a subset of employees can be 
probative as to the experiences of all of them.”126 Consequently, in Tyson, the 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See JAY L. DEVORE, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FOR ENGINEERING AND THE 
SCIENCES 300–44 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing tests for hypotheses based on sampling). According 
to a leading law and economics jurist, recently retired Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit, “statistically significant at the five percent level” means “that the probability that the 
investigation would have yielded this result even if the hypothesis that it was trying to test was 
false is no greater than five percent.” Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of 
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1510–11 (1999) (footnote omitted). He points out that social 
scientists consider results at the two percent or one percent level “more robust” and “highly 
significant.” Id. at 1511. Judge Posner continues: 
What is true is that the higher the significance level of a statistical study, the more 
reliable the study is as evidence; and the lower that level, the less reliable it is. A 
low significance level may reflect an unsound method of statistical estimation, an 
incorrect specification of the hypothesis being tested, or the omission of relevant 
variables that if included would have caused the hypothesis to be rejected. . . . But if 
the study has been conducted responsibly and has withstood a hammering from the 
opponent’s expert, failure to reach the conventional five percent significance level 
would not be a good reason for excluding the evidence just because a social scientist 
who violated the conventions of his discipline by reporting results that do not attain 
the conventional significance level might be considered untrustworthy. 
Id. But, Judge Posner concludes that, given the “cost of weak statistical evidence,” and “[g]iven 
the difficulty that judges and jurors have in understanding and weighing statistical evidence, there 
is an argument . . . for excluding statistical evidence that the relevant profession . . . considers 
weak.” Id. at 1512. 
 124 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
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Court held that it was proper to draw a “just and reasonable inference” from 
the statistical evidence to prove the “amount and extent of” work performed 
by each class member, and, as Chief Justice Roberts stated in his concurring 
opinion, the “just and reasonable inference” standard of proof “would apply 
in any case.”127  
In a recent article, one author summarized the evidentiary issue in this 
manner: 
The threshold question for admitting such evidence is therefore not 
about whether the evidence is statistical or representative more 
broadly, or even about whether direct evidence, if it existed, would 
exhibit any differences across plaintiffs. Rather, the threshold 
question that evidence law poses for any such evidence is whether 
it is relevant [as Rule 401 defines relevance]. . . . When the 
evidence in question involves expert testimony, then Rule 702 and 
Daubert also come into play.128 
 In short, the more heterogeneous the individual damages claims of the 
class members are from one another, the less confident one can be that the 
sample average can be accurately applied to calculate individual damages.  
 In Part IV of this Article, we propose a method to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance, notwithstanding variable individual damages claims. 
Specifically, we propose a statistically-based threshold for admissibility of 
sampling evidence by showing that, when judgment variability exceeds claim 
variability (two terms we define), applying the mean of damages awards for 
sampled class members’ claims, rather than individual damages awards, 
improves accuracy. We demonstrate that, in many circumstances, sampling 
evidence is more accurate and more reliable than individual damages awards 
and, therefore, admissible. 
D. Daubert and Class Certification Proceedings 
Daubert has played a critical, often decisive, role in class certification 
proceedings. As prerequisites to class certification, plaintiffs must show, 
among other things, that “there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class” and, if plaintiffs seek classwide damages, that “the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Id. at 1047 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 128 Gelbach, supra note 9, at 1830–31. Professor Gelbach opines that the “critical question for 
any representative evidence” is whether “those who testify or form the sample used to create 
statistical evidence are similar enough in relevant ways to reliably measure” the disputed value for 
an individual class member. Id. at 1831. 
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methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”129 With 
increasing frequency, expert evidence is proffered during class certification 
proceedings to attempt to satisfy or defeat the commonality, predominance, 
and superiority prerequisites. With equally increasing frequency, Daubert 
challenges are made to the proffered expert evidence. 
In Comcast, although the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review, among other questions presented for review, the question 
of whether Daubert standards for the admissibility of expert evidence apply 
in class certification proceedings, the Court did not reach that question 
because, at trial, Comcast failed to “timely object to or move to strike” 
plaintiffs’ expert’s damages model.130 However, a majority of Circuit Courts 
that have considered the question, both before and after Comcast, have held 
that a full Daubert analysis of expert evidence is required at the class 
certification stage.131 
In dicta, the Wal-Mart Court signaled its view: “[T]he District Court 
concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification 
stage of class-action proceedings. . . . We doubt that is so . . . .”132 Therefore, 
the clear weight of authority is that expert evidence will be scrutinized under 
                                                                                                                           
 129 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“[W]e think it clear that individualized monetary claims belong 
in Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 130 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2013) (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting); see FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(A) (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit . . . 
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and . . . [the party] on the record 
. . . timely objects or moves to strike . . . .”). 
 131 See, e.g., In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2015); Messner 
v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011); Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App’x 887, 890–91 (11th 
Cir. 2011); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528–32 (6th Cir. 2008); Unger v. 
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit represents the minority 
view. See, e.g., Smith v. Conoco Phillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 925 n.2 (8th Cir. 2015); In 
re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th Cir. 2011) (ruling that federal 
district court “did not err by conducting a focused Daubert analysis” at class certification stage). 
See generally L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using 
Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1041 (2004); George G. Gordon & Irene Ayzenberg-Lyman, The Role of Daubert in Scrutinizing 
Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 132 (2014), http://
www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Gordon_Final_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDC8-
T2PH]; Richard L. Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the 
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011); Meredith M. Price, The Proper 
Application of Daubert to Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1349 (2012); Heather P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class Certification Expert: The Roles 
of Daubert and the Defendant’s Proof, 28 REV. LITIG. 71 (2008). 
 132 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). This view is consistent with the Court’s 
instruction in Daubert that a federal district court, “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific 
testimony . . . must determine [the admissibility of the evidence] at the outset.” Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 592–93 & n.10. 
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Daubert standards during class certification proceedings. As one author 
argued: 
If defendant contends that the evidence relied upon by plaintiffs for 
class certification would be inadmissible at trial, the court must 
decide the admissibility question at the class certification stage. For 
example, if testimony relied on by plaintiffs in support of 
certification would be admissible under one view of the substantive 
law but inadmissible under another, the court must decide the legal 
issue to ensure that, in fact, plaintiffs’ evidence supporting class 
certification would in fact be admissible at trial.133 
He cogently explained, “[i]f an expert will not be permitted to testify at all at 
trial, plaintiff should not be able to rely on that inadmissible testimony in 
support of class certification.”134 
In sum, a federal district court must be convinced that, “if credited by 
the fact finder,” plaintiff’s evidence supporting class certification would tend 
to prove one or more liability or damages claims or defenses on a classwide 
basis.135 Therefore, the evidence must be admissible and, for expert evidence, 
it must be relevant and reliable and otherwise satisfy Daubert standards. 
“Once the court determines that plaintiff[’s] evidence is . . . admissible at trial, 
however, it should not weigh plaintiff[’s] evidence against defendant’s 
evidence” to attempt to resolve which is more persuasive.136 
The factors identified by the Supreme Court and the Advisory 
Committee guide the inquiry into the relevancy and reliability of expert 
testimony and create a framework for determining the admissibility of 
sampling evidence in class actions, including during class certification 
proceedings.137 
III. SAMPLING EVIDENCE AND CLASS ACTION PREREQUISITES: 
COMMONALITY, PREDOMINANCE, AND SUPERIORITY 
The answer to the question whether sampling evidence is admissible to 
prove classwide liability or classwide damages is rooted in the prerequisites 
for class certification. “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively 
demonstrate . . . compliance with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23].”138 
Rule 23(a)’s four threshold requirements—numerosity (or impracticability of 
joinder), commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—
                                                                                                                           
 133 Klonoff, supra note 83, at 758. 
 134 Id. at 760. 
        135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 760–61; see infra notes 163–167 and accompanying text. 
 137 See supra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
 138 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
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“effectively ‘limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named 
plaintiff’s claims.’”139 Certification is proper only “if the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have 
been satisfied.”140  
A. Commonality 
Commonality requires plaintiffs to show that “there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class.”141 In brief, “[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”142 
Consequently, the class claims must depend on a “common contention,” one 
that “is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of 
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 
one of the claims in one stroke.”143 “Identifying common questions typically 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. 
EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). Disputes regarding the admissibility of statistical evidence in 
class actions most often arise in the contexts of the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2) and 
the predominance and superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3). For present purposes, numerosity 
(or impracticability of joinder), typicality, and adequacy of representation are therefore of little 
moment. For a thorough discussion of those prerequisites, see 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:11–3:17, at 185–227 (5th ed. 2016) (numerosity (or 
impracticability of joinder)); id. §§ 3:28–3:49, at 262–320 (typicality); id. §§ 3:50–3:88, at 320–
443 (adequacy of representation); as well as the implicit requirements of definiteness, id. §§ 3:2–
3:7, at 155–76, and ascertainability of class membership, id. §§ 3:8–3:10, at 176–85. 
 140 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161; see Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous 
analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.”); Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (“[T]he class determination generally involves 
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.’” (quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963) (footnote 
omitted))). 
 Initially, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court 
pronounced “[w]e find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it 
may be maintained as a class action.” 417 U.S. at 177. However, four years later, in Coopers & 
Lybrand, the Court retreated from this bright-line proposition by quoting approvingly from a 
leading treatise: “Evaluation of many of the questions entering into determination of class action 
questions [e.g., typicality, adequacy of representation, commonality] is intimately involved with 
the merits of the claims . . . . The more complex determinations required in Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions entail even greater entanglement with the merits . . . .” 437 U.S. at 469 n.12 (quoting 15 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45 
(1976)). Then, in Falcon, the Court surmised that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to 
probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” 457 U.S. at 160. 
The Court subsequently made it clear that Rule 23 does not authorize “free-ranging merits 
inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to 
the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether Rule 23 prerequisites for class 
certification are satisfied.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 
(2013). 
 141 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 142 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157). 
 143 Id. at 350. 
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requires examining the parties’ claims and defenses, identifying the type of 
proof the parties expect to present, and deciding the extent to which there is a 
need for individual, as opposed to common, proof.”144 For purposes of Rule 
23(a)(2), “[e]ven a single [common] question” will do.145 
Although it is generally conceded that Wal-Mart raised the bar to 
establish commonality, that decision has not changed the observation that the 
“commonality test is easily met in most cases.”146 
B. Predominance 
Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must also show that “questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members.”147 Determining whether common questions 
predominate over individual questions requires a “qualitative rather than [] 
quantitative” “pragmatic assessment of the entire action and all the issues 
involved.”148 As defined by the Tyson Court, “[a]n individual question is one 
                                                                                                                           
 144 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.141, at 257 (2004). 
 145 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 376 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 176 n.110 (2003)); see FED. RULE CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s 
notes to 1937 amendment (citing with approval cases in which “there was only a question of law 
or fact common to” class members). 
 146 See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:24, at 251 (5th 
ed. 2011); supra note 24; see e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 
426, 438 (7th Cir. 2015) (whether “subjective, discretionary decisions” were based on company 
policy or practice); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 903–17 (4th Cir. 2015) (whether 
promotions were denied because of racial discrimination); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F. 
App’x 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2015) (whether defect existed and whether defendant had duty to 
disclose defect); Jimenez v. Allstate Ins., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164–66 (9th Cir. 2014) (whether claims 
adjusters must be paid for off-the-clock overtime); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 
755–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (whether seller’s packaging likely to mislead reasonable consumer); In re 
Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 809–12 (5th Cir. 2014) (whether class members suffered same 
injury, even though injurious effects (damages) were diverse); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 
731 F.3d 952, 957–63 (9th Cir. 2013) (whether security guards were required to work through 
meal periods); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (whether 
washing machines were defective); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 858–61 (6th Cir. 2013) (whether product design defects caused mold, 
mildew, and bacteria); Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 693 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(whether insurers charged incorrect local tax on policyholders’ premiums); Ross v. RBS Citizens, 
N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 908–10 (7th Cir. 2012) (whether bank broadly enforced policy denying 
earned-overtime compensation), cert. granted, vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013). 
 147 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) was the “most adventuresome” addition to Rule 23 
by the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Benjamin Kaplan, A Preparatory 
Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969). “Rule 23(b)(3) added to the complex-
litigation arsenal class actions for damages designed to secure judgments binding all class 
members save those who affirmatively elected to be excluded.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 614–15 (1997). 
 148 Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET 
AL., 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.45[1], at 23–215 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Parko, 739 
F.3d at 1085; Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc., 385 F. App’x 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2010); Vinole v. 
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where ‘members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies 
from member to member’ while a common question is one where ‘the same 
evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the 
issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’”149 
As instructed by the Supreme Court in Erica P. John Fund, 
“[c]onsidering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate’ begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of 
action.”150 A federal district court must identify the relevant factual and legal 
issues and “compare the issues subject to common proof against the issues 
subject solely to individualized proof.”151 As previously noted, the 
predominance inquiry thus “generally involves considerations that are 
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s causes of 
action.”152 
After “careful scrutiny” of “the relation between common and individual 
questions,” a federal district court must decide “whether proposed classes are 
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”153 “Even if 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied by [class members’] 
shared experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding.”154 
“The predominance inquiry ‘asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling 
issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, 
aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’”155 
There is no litmus test. Some federal courts consider whether issues 
“that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a 
whole, . . . predominate over those issues that are subject only to 
                                                                                                                           
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 
Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 
219, 227–29 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 149 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)). 
 150 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011) (quoting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(3)); see supra note 13. 
 151 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 197 (5th ed. 
2012). 
 152 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013) (citation omitted); see supra note 13; 
Taha v. County of Bucks, 862 F.3d 292, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Clearly, the trier of fact should 
be able to determine whether a violation was ‘willful’ [“only remaining question of fact”] by 
considering common evidence regarding defendants’ actions and intent without taking into 
account information regarding the individual class members.”); see also supra note 140 and 
accompanying text. 
 153 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. 
 154 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–24. Note that “[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain 
cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 625 (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1937 amendment). 
 155 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:49, at 195–96 (5th ed. 2012)). 
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individualized proof.”156 Others focus on whether the substantive elements of 
class members’ claims require the same proof for each class member.157 And 
others regard whether one or more common issues constitute significant 
elements of each class member’s individual claims or are a significant aspect 
of a case.158 Still others consider whether common issues are “more 
substantial than the issues subject only to individualized proof.”159 Some 
courts also assess judicial resources and the parties’ litigation expenses to 
decide whether it would be more efficient to determine one or more issues on 
a classwide basis rather than to adjudicate all issues in separate 
proceedings.160 
Rule 23(b)(3) “does not require a plaintiff seeking class certification to 
prove that each element of her claim is susceptible to classwide proof,” only 
that common questions “predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual class members.”161 If questions affecting individual class members 
do not “overwhelm common ones,” the class is “sufficiently cohesive to 
warrant adjudication by representation.”162 
Importantly, “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common 
to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the 
merits, in favor of the class.”163 As the Supreme Court observed in Amgen, a 
plaintiff seeking Rule 23(b)(3) class certification does not need to “first 
establish that it will win the fray” because that would be “put[ting] the cart 
before the horse.”164 The Court explained, “the office of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
certification ruling is not to adjudicate the case; rather, it is to select the 
‘metho[d]’ best suited to adjudication of the controversy ‘fairly and 
efficiently.’”165 
Moreover, “[h]ow many (if any) of the class members have a valid claim 
is the issue to be determined after the class is certified.”166 Indeed, if plaintiffs 
satisfy all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), a class may be 
certified even if none of the putative class members ultimately recovers, 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 483 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 157 See, e.g., Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013); Rosario v. 
Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 158 See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 815 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470–71 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 159 Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 160 See, e.g., Butler, 727 F.3d at 798. 
 161 Amgen, 568 U.S. at 469 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 162 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
623. 
 163 Amgen, 568 U.S. at 459. 
 164 Id. at 460. 
 165 Id. (paraphrasing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
 166 Parko, 739 F.3d at 1085. 
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either because class defendant prevails on the merits of a classwide 
dispositive issue, or because class members’ claims ultimately fail for 
different reasons.167 
Our proposal to determine class members’ individual damages by 
following a statistically-based sampling method would resolve a “common 
contention” “in one stroke” because “the same evidence will suffice for each 
member to make a prima facie showing” of individual damages and the 
damages issues would be “susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.”168 
Unless classwide liability issues are subject to individualized proof, and those 
issues “are more prevalent or important” than damages issues, the 
determination of individual damages will predominate.169 Historically, 
however, many putative class actions fail because they cannot satisfy the 
predominance prerequisite.170 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Amgen, 568 U.S. at 470 & n.5; see, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d at 1245, 
1254 (10th Cir. 2014); DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2009); Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am., 148 F.3d 283, 307 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 If a class is certified and it is thereafter discovered that some class members do not have valid 
claims against the class defendant, a federal district court can alter or amend its certification order 
to narrow or refine the definition of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that 
grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”); cf. Kohen, 
571 F.3d at 677 (suggesting random selection of class members to prove whether large numbers 
did not suffer from alleged securities laws violations and that “a class will often include persons 
who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct . . . . [s]uch a possibility or indeed 
inevitability does not preclude class certification”). 
 A federal district court can also grant summary judgment in favor of the class defendant on 
uninjured class members’ claims, see Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (noting that where there is “[an 
alleged] failure of proof as to an element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage 
that question as a matter of summary judgment, not class certification” (quoting Nagareda, supra 
note 83, at 107)); Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(noting that “alleged failure of proof” should be decided through dispositive motion, “not class 
certification”), or instruct the jury not to base any damages awards on such claims, see Tyson, 136 
S. Ct. at 1044–45. 
 168 See Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wal-Mart, 
564 U.S. at 349–50 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157). 
 169 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 170 See, e.g., Arnold v. Direct TV, LLC, Case No. 4:10-CV-352-JAR, 2017 WL 1251033, at 
*7, 12 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ proposed damages analysis cannot be performed on 
a classwide basis. . . . Plaintiffs here have insufficient records to establish their individualized 
unreported work time.”); Local 589 v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 13-cv-11455-ADB, 2016 
WL 5109508, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 2016) (“individual liability and damages, which will be a 
highly individualized undertaking”); Perez v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 14-cv-0989-PJH, 2016 WL 
4180190, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (liability cannot “be established in the absence of 
individualized inquiries”); Atkins v. United States, No. 4:15 CV 933 CDP, 2016 WL 3878466, at 
*5 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2016) (questioning use of “representative samplings” and finding no 
predominance of common issues “given the proposed development of adequate, individualized 
evidence”); Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 314 F.R.D. 457, 477 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding there 
was no “common proof” to determine whether employees qualified for FLSA exemption). 
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C. Superiority 
To certify a damages class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a federal 
district court must also find that “a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”171 
Rule 23(b)(3) identifies four non-exclusive factors that pertain to a 
superiority finding: “the class members’ interests in individually controlling 
the prosecution or defense of separate actions”; “the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class 
members”; “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forum”; and “the likely difficulties in managing a 
class action.”172 
The manageability factor is the one most heavily litigated and the one 
most germane to the use of sampling evidence.173 Ceteris paribus, as the size 
of the putative class increases, the potential efficiency, and hence superiority, 
of a class action increases, especially if there are truly common questions. 
The goals of the predominance and superiority prerequisites are to 
“achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity 
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural 
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”174 There should be no 
doubt that our proposal would achieve the economy goals and promote 
uniform individual damages awards for similarly situated class members. 
                                                                                                                           
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). “[O]ther available methods” may include individual actions, 
joinder of claims, or “test” or “bellwether” trials, among others. See generally 2 WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:85–4:88, at 357–74 (5th ed. 2012). 
Typically, federal courts consider the manageability of a class action relative to alternative 
methods of adjudication and are usually reluctant to deny class certification on this ground. See, 
e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2013); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 
382 F.3d 1241, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phx. 
Bond & Indem., Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). 
 Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions are often superior to other available methods of 
adjudication in “negative value cases,” cases involving numerous individuals with small damages 
claims that, absent a class action or other form of aggregate adjudication, would have no remedies. 
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616–17; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 
(1985); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); Carnegie v. Household Int’l 
Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions are also usually a 
more efficient and economical method to adjudicate numerous claims based on the same or similar 
causes of action, for example, mass torts. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860–
61 (1999); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 
421 U.S. 454, 466–67 n.12 (1975); Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974). 
 172 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D); see Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 
82 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that, although the structure of Rule 23(b)(3) suggests that the factors 
apply to both the predominance and superiority prerequisites, the factors “more clearly implicate 
the superiority inquiry”). 
 173 For discussions of all four factors, see COQUILLETTE ET AL., supra note 148, 
§§ 23.46[2][a]–3[c] at 23-272–23-294. 
 174 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 
amendment) (alterations in the original). 
2018] The Admissibility of Sampling Evidence 691 
And, because we advocate following our method only when judgment 
variability, the randomness that each class member’s damages claim is 
already exposed to, exceeds claim variability, the substantive differences 
among the class members’ damages claims, no procedural fairness would be 
sacrificed.175 
One “matter[] pertinent to these findings [predominance and superiority] 
include[s] . . . the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”176 In opposing 
class certification, defendant will often argue that, even if liability to the class 
is a common question, the determinations of what, if any, damages are owed to 
the class as a whole or to its individual members are complex and fact-
specific, rendering class proceedings unmanageable.177 
D. Aggregate Damages and Individual Damages 
When considering Rule 23(b)(3) classwide damages issues, aggregate 
damages and individual damages should be distinguished. Aggregate 
damages are the total amount of damages that the class defendant, if found 
liable, pays the entire class.  Individual damages are the separate portions of 
that total amount that each class member with a valid claim is awarded in 
damages.178 
Arguments about damages often arise at the class certification stage 
because plaintiffs must demonstrate that one or more common issues 
predominate over individual ones. To attempt to defeat certification of a Rule 
23(b)(3) damages class, a defendant will often argue that individual damages 
calculations predominate over common liability issues. By citing and quoting 
approvingly a leading treatise, the Tyson Court put to rest an issue that had 
perplexed federal courts: whether the need to prove individual damages 
precludes Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. It ruled: 
When “one or more of the central issues in the action are common 
to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See infra notes 249–262 and accompanying text. 
 176 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 177 See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n effort 
to determine a million consumers’ individual losses would make the suit unmanageable.”); 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Because injury determinations must be made on an individual basis in this case, adjudicating the 
claims as a class will not reduce litigation or save scarce judicial resources.”); Rutstein v. Avis 
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2000) (damages claims “focus almost 
entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole” (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(“[I]ndividualized monetary damages determinations for more than a thousand potential plaintiffs 
would require multiple juries . . . . [and] implicated significant . . . efficiency, and manageability 
problems.”). 
 178 See generally 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:1–
12:5, at 89–120 (5th ed. 2014). 
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considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important 
matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages . . . 
peculiar to some individual class members.”179  
Indeed, “[r]ecognition that individual damages calculations do not 
preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”180 
Thus, it is now clear that classwide liability may be adjudicated and individual 
damages determined, if necessary, in later proceedings.181 That said, before 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045. (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1778, at 123–24 (3d ed. 2005)); see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of 
similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so 
despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by 
individuals within the class.”); Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 833 (8th Cir. 
2016) (quoting Tyson). 
 180 Comcast, 569 U.S. at 42 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing 2 WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:54, at 205 (5th ed. 2012)); see, e.g., 
Roach 778 F.3d at 405; Levya, 716 F.3d at 513–14; In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 
F.3d at 227; Klay, 382 F.3d at 1259–60; Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 428–30 
(4th Cir. 2003); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003); Sterling v. 
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 181 See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It is 
well established that, if a case requires determinations of individual issues of causation and 
damages, a court may bifurcate the case into a liability phase and a damages phase.” (citations 
omitted)); Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is ‘a 
misreading of Comcast’ to interpret it as ‘preclud[ing] certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in any 
case where the class members’ damages are not susceptible to a formula for classwide 
measurement.’” (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815 & n.104)); Roach, 778 F.3d at 
402 (“We hold that Comcast does not mandate that certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires 
a finding that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”); In re Urethane 
Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d at 1257–58 (“[W]e know from the actual trial that individualized issues 
did not predominate.”); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Even after 
Comcast, the predominance inquiry can still be satisfied under Rule 23(b)(3) if the proceedings 
are structured to establish ‘liability on a class-wide basis, with separate hearings to determine—if 
liability is established—the damages of individual class members.’” (citations omitted)); In re 
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860–61 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“[D]istrict court certified only a liability class and reserved all issues concerning damages for 
individual determination.”); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 
6, 28–30 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that “[p]redominance is not defeated by individual damages 
questions as long as liability is still subject to common proof,” and vacating and remanding class 
certification order, in part, to reconsider liability issues); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 
& n.11 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issues class despite “think[ing] it unlikely that 
the calculation of damages will be suitable for class determination”); Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 
F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class certification for common liability 
issues and noting that federal district court can bifurcate liability issues from damages issues); In 
re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing 
“management tools available to a district court to address any individualized damages issues”); In 
re Simply Orange Juice Mkting. & Sales Prac., Master Case No. 4:12-md-02361-FJG, 2017 WL 
3142095, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2017) (finding damages cannot be established through 
common evidence, but certifying liability issues class under Rule 23(c)(4)). 
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certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class, a federal district court must still weigh 
whether individual damages issues will overwhelm common liability issues.182 
Plaintiff may argue that, even without a proposal regarding how to 
determine individual damages, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite 
is met by a trial plan to prove aggregate damages.183 Defendant, while still 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973)) (rejecting “fluid recovery” whereby 
“aggregate liability” would initially be determined and then distributed “usually through a 
simplified proof of claim procedure”); Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260 (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class 
certification, but noting “[i]t is primarily when there are significant individualized questions going 
to liability that the need for individualized assessments of damages is enough to preclude [Rule] 
23(b)(3) certification”). 
 183 See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting 
as a matter of law that plaintiffs are obligated “to drill down and estimate each individual class 
member’s damages” at class certification stage); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price 
Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 197–98 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The use of aggregate damages calculations is well 
established in federal court and implied by the very existence of the class action mechanism 
itself.”); see also Hickory Sec. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 493 F. App’x 156, 160 (2d Cir. 
2012) (remanding to federal district court to calculate “aggregate damage award [that] would 
‘roughly reflect’ the loss to each [sub]class”); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., Case No. 11-CV-
565-NJR-RJD, 2017 WL 3704206, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2017) (“[D]amages are capable of 
being measured on a class-wide basis using” models.); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 
MDL No. 2437, 13-md-2437, 2017 WL 3623466, at *46 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) (noting that 
there is “no need to show individual damages for individual Plaintiffs” at class certification stage 
and finding proposed model was sufficient “for classwide proof of measurable damages”); La. 
Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv-289, 
2017 WL 3149424, at *6–7 (D. Vt. July 21, 2017) (stock price “event study” “methodology . . . 
can be applied on a class-wide basis”); Gordon v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 13-
7175, 2017 WL 3116153, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2017) (damages measurable on classwide basis); 
In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2017 WL 1421627, at 
*23 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017) (“Plaintiffs have devised a reasonable and reliable solution to 
calculate remediation damages on a class-wide basis and accommodate individual class damage 
issues by shifting the individual damage components to subsequent adjudicative phases.”); In re 
Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 320 F.R.D. 326, 337 (D.N.H. 2017) (proffered 
calculation capable of establishing “full extent of damages on a class-wide basis”); Martin v. 
Monsanto Co., No. ED CV 16-2168-JFW (SPx), 2017 WL 1115167, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 
2017) (benefit-of-the-bargain model to determine total damages); Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral 
Energy, LLC, No. CIV-11-0634-HE, 2017 WL 187542, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017) (expert’s 
model “can determine damages on a class wide basis”); Fond Du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li 
Enter. Co., No. 09-CV-0852, 2016 WL 3579953, at *11 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2016) (“[R]egression 
analysis serves as a sufficiently reliable method for establishing that damages can be proven on a 
class-wide basis.”). 
 Decisions holding that Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites are satisfied by a trial plan to prove 
aggregate damages find support from dicta in Comcast. The damages model that plaintiffs 
proposed in Comcast did not purport to calculate damages suffered by each class member, and the 
model was not challenged or rejected on that basis. The Supreme Court rejected the model finding 
it did not satisfy the predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3) because it “falls far short of 
establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.” Comcast, 569 U.S. at 
34. That is, the damages model failed to measure aggregate damages. Id. The Court stated that 
“[w]ithout presenting another methodology, . . . [q]uestions of individual damage calculations will 
inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” Id. The negative implication of the Court’s 
statement is that a damages model that could determine aggregate damages would have satisfied 
the predominance prerequisite. 
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asserting that common questions do not predominate over individual ones, 
may counter that proving only aggregate damages is not sufficient to satisfy 
Rule 23(b)(3) and may raise the possibility of numerous mini-trials to 
calculate individual damages. Many federal courts have held that proof of 
aggregate damages is sufficient for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification purposes 
if plaintiff also proposes a common methodology to calculate individual 
damages.184 
Alternatively, if aggregate damages cannot be proven, plaintiff may 
argue that Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites are still satisfied by proposing a 
common methodology to determine individual damages. A leading treatise 
states: 
[T]he predominance inquiry is focused on . . . [whether] there must 
be a single or common method that can be used to measure and 
quantify the damages of each class member, lest individual 
damages calculations predominate over common questions of 
liability. The class proponents’ task, therefore, is to demonstrate a 
method for quantifying individual damages that applies across the 
board and hence is common to the class: a common classwide 
method for calculating individual damages.185 
In many class actions, a common methodology to determine individual 
damages exists.186 On the other hand, several federal courts have denied Rule 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See, e.g., Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 106 (2d Cir. 2017) (damages for 
individual class members could be calculated by applying a method across the entire class); In re 
Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., No. 1:10 M D 2196-JZ, 2015 WL 4459636, at *8 (N.D. Ohio 
Jul. 21, 2015) (“A well-designed claims process can ensure each class member receives damage 
payments only if and as appropriate.”); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. 
168, 183 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[T]wo sets of common damages are calculated and presented under a 
reasonable and judicially acceptable methodology.”); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., Nos. 02-
1830-FSH, 02-2731-FSH, 2011 WL 286118, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan 25, 2011) (“[A]t class 
certification, Plaintiffs need only demonstrate that they have a ‘viable method’ for calculating 
damages that is common to the class.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 323–
24 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“yardsticks” available to measure drug overprices). 
 185 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:4, at 110–11 (5th 
ed. 2014) (footnotes omitted); see Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corp., 870 F.3d 1170, 1182 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“Uncertainty regarding class members’ damages does not prevent certification of a class as 
long as a valid method has been proposed for calculating those damages.”). 
 186 See, e.g., Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (post-Comcast remand affirming certification of liability 
only class and noting “damages of individual class members can be readily determined in 
individual hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses”); Leyva, 716 F.3d at 
514 (reversing denial of Rule 23(b)(3) class certification because defendant’s “computerized 
payroll and time-keeping database would enable the court to accurately calculate damages and 
related penalties for each claim”); Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 
372 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing cases) (“Should it appear that the calculation of monetary relief will be 
mechanical, formulaic, a task not for a trier of fact but for a computer program . . . the district 
court can award that relief without terminating the class action and leaving the class members to 
their own devices . . . .”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) 
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(identical formula could be used for all class members); Similow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 
323 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2003) (computer program could calculate damages for cellphone 
users allegedly overcharged for incoming calls); Leon v. Diversified Concrete, LLC, No. 15-6301-
CJB, 2016 WL 6247674, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2016) (statutory damages awards); Hurt v. 
Commerce Energy, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00758-JSG, 2015 WL 1298674, at *2 & n.20 (N.D. Ohio 
2015) (“[A]lthough the damages would be unique for each class member, they would all be 
determined by applying a consistent methodology—a mathematical formula based on the number 
of hours worked and the amount of wages already earned.”); Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 
297 F.R.D. 431, 456 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (Rule 23(b)(3) settlement with personnel and payroll 
records to determine each class member’s damages); Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 393 
(D. Ariz. 2013), amended in part sub nom. Estrada v. Bashas’, Inc., 2014 WL 1319189 (D. Ariz. 
2014) (demonstrating model for calculating backpay “through a computer program, and relying 
upon ‘objective factors’ such as ‘the individual employee payroll record (dates of employment[,] 
job position, hours worked) and the wage scale,’. . . plaintiffs will be able to calculate back pay 
losses for ‘each eligible class member’”); In re Diamond Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 295 F.R.D. 240, 
252 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[C]omputing individual damages will be virtually a mechanical task.” 
(quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975)); In re Checking Account 
Overdraft Litig., 286 F.R.D. 645, 658 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (damages “ministerial[ly]” calculated using 
class defendant’s records); Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, Ltd., 246 F.R.D. 293, 
311–13 (D.D.C. 2007) (overcharges “will be readily susceptible to formulaic analysis that does 
not require individualized inquiry as to each Class member”). 
 For post-Tyson decisions where federal district courts endorsed common methodologies to 
assess individual damages, see, for example, Snipes v. Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-
00878-MCE-DB, 2017 WL 5754894, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (valid statistical method for 
calculating classwide damages); Luna v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. C 15-05447 WHA, 2017 
WL 4865559, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017) (event study on market efficiency to calculate 
classwide damages); Johnson v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 15-cv-04138-WHO, 2017 WL 
2224828, at *16 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2017) (damages measured based on defendant’s records); 
Cazares v. AVA Rest. Corp., 15-CV-0477(KAM)(RML), 2017 WL 1229727, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 2017) (“[D]etermining damages . . . would be a matter of performing simple arithmetic 
using the data defendants have produced.”); Kramer v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 11 C 8758, 2017 
WL 1196965, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Plaintiffs propose a class-wide method of 
calculating damages, based on the hours that an individual class member worked . . . .”); Herman 
v. Seaworld Parks & Entm’t, Inc., Case No. 8:14-cv-3028-MSS-JSS, 2017 WL 1304302, at *18 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2017) (statutory damages “can be easily calculated utilizing class-wide data 
available from” defendant); Balderrama-Baca v. Clarence Davids & Co., 318 F.R.D. 603, 613–14 
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (“calculating individual damages will be a simple ministerial matter of gathering 
employee pay records” and applying “statutory damages formula”); Durant v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. No. 2-15-CV-01710-RAJ, 2017 WL 950588, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2017) 
(“able to calculate the [individualized] damages based on the submitted records”); McCurdy v. 
Prof’l Credit Serv., No. 6:15-cv-01498-AA, 2016 WL 5853721, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2016) 
(statutory damages); Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc., No. 15-cv-00660-HSG, 2016 WL 
4073336, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (class members’ payments calculated formulaically); 
Sibley v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 315 F.R.D. 642, 662–63 (D. Kan. 2016) (plaintiffs’ experts supplied 
“a ‘fancy’ computerized commission-calculation model to quantify individual damages for each 
class-member plaintiff”); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2016 WL 4010049, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016) (remedies 
consisted of only two options); Manouchehri v. Styles for Less, Inc., No. 14 cv 2521 NLS, 2016 
WL 3387473, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) (damages “can be calculated using a common 
methodology of calculation”); Jimenez v. Menzies Aviation, Inc., No. 15-cv-02392-WHO, 2016 
WL 3231106, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (“[U]niform pay stubs can serve as a common 
form of proof . . . .”); Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG, Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 304 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016) (“[C]ommon evidence and a regression analysis could be used to create a model for 
quantifying the estimated cost to class members resulting from Defendants’ challenged conduct.”); 
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23(b)(3) class certification where individual damages could not be computed 
formulaically.187 Others, however, have held that the failure to propose a 
model to determine individual damages does not defeat predominance.188 
The message to proponents of statistical evidence is that the evidence 
must demonstrate how and why the evidence is both relevant and reliable to 
prove either classwide liability, or aggregate damages or individual damages. 
                                                                                                                           
Harper v. Law Office of Harris & Zyde LLP, No. 15-cv-0114-HS6, 2016 WL 2344194, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (putative class seeking only statutory damages, therefore, there were no 
“individual questions in this action”); Chastain v. Cam, No. 3:13-cv-01802-SI, 2016 WL 1572542, 
at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2016) (“[O]bjective factors such as payroll records will allow for damage 
calculations on a class-wide basis.”); Dekeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 449, 
455 (E.D. Wisc. 2016) (damages would involve “mere mathematical computations”); cf. In re Dial 
Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 77 (D.N.H. 2015) (“[P]laintiffs have 
provided insufficient detail regarding their proposed methodologies for calculating classwide 
damages.”); Weidenhamer v. Expedia, Inc., No. C14-1239-RAJ, 2015 WL 7157282, at *15 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 13, 2015) (“[F]ailure to present a model or other method of evaluating class-wide 
injury weighs against a finding that common issues predominate.”). 
 187 See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that it was “clear from the record that the damages claims . . . are not subject to any sort of 
formulaic calculation”); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 2005) (no “reliable 
methodology to determine the premiums paid”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 
294, 307 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Class treatment, . . . may not be suitable where the calculation of 
damages is not susceptible to a mathematical or formulaic calculation . . . .”); Sikes v. Teleline, 
Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1366 (11th Cir. 2002) (“extensive individualized inquiries on the issues of 
injury and damages”), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 
U.S. 639 (2008); Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 66–67 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc) 
(“The claims could not be proved by any set method of mathematical or formula calculation but 
would require individual proof and trial . . . .”); Little v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth., Civil 
Action No. 14-1289 (RMC), 2017 WL 1403122, at *22 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2017) (no “formulaic 
approach for determining class-wide damages”). 
 In Amchem, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court improperly certified asbestos-
related personal injury claims because the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite was not 
satisfied. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Court 
disallowed a proposed class action settlement in another asbestos case, purportedly brought under 
the limited fund provision of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Amchem and Ortiz may indicate that mass tort 
cases involving damages claims for personal injuries are unlikely to be certified as class actions. 
Conversely, when a single accident gives rise to common liability and causation issues, those 
issues may predominate over individual damages issues. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest 
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[P]utative class members are all symptomatic 
by definition and claim injury from the same defective ventilation system over the same general 
period of time.”); cf. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815–20 (affirming settlement class 
certification for “economic loss and property damage”). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous 
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant 
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, 
affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally 
as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 188 See, e.g., Roach, 778 F.3d at 408–09. 
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Moreover, the proffered statistical evidence must tend to prove “common, 
aggregation-enabling, issues.”189  
As we will soon demonstrate, the sampling evidence we propose is both 
relevant and reliable and proves each class member’s individual damages.190 
As such, it is probative regarding “common, aggregation-enabling, issues.” 
E. Bifurcation 
Although there must be at least one common issue for a case to be 
certified as a class action, typically there are individual issues as well.191 In 
those rarer cases that only raise issues that are shared by all class members, 
there is no need for individual proofs, and a unitary trial is held.192 In many 
situations, however, a trial is bifurcated and common issues (often liability 
issues) are resolved in the trial’s first phase and individual issues (frequently 
damages issues) are adjudicated in the trial’s second phase.193 As a popular 
treatise explains: 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)). 
 190 One federal district court has concluded that, “at a minimum, reliability under Rule 23 is a 
higher standard than reliability under Daubert.” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 
MDL Dock. No. 1869, Misc. No. 07-0489 (PLF), 2017 WL 5311533, at *50 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 
2017) (citations omitted). The court opined that, because it “must resolve expert disputes that bear 
on class certification. . . . [t]his may require evaluating the conclusions and results of competing 
experts, which goes beyond the scope of the Daubert inquiry.” Id. The court continued that a 
“‘rigorous analysis’ of whether plaintiffs have established predominance is certainly a more in-
depth inquiry than required under Daubert.” Id. 
 191 As discussed previously in Part III, for a case to proceed as a money damages class action 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues must predominate over individual ones and the class 
action device must be superior to other available methods of adjudication. See supra notes 147–
177 and accompanying text. 
 192 The prototypical case is one where liability is based on defendant’s conduct and the class 
is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) (“[T]he party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”). See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment 
(“[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with 
discriminating unlawfully against a class,” retailers against a seller based on illegal price 
discrimination, and purchasers or licensees against a patentee based on illegal “tying” conditions). 
 193 See, e.g., Vaquero, 824 F.3d at 1153–55 (affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class certification on 
liability issues where plaintiff “proposed to resolve the damages phase . . . through use of a 
survey, sampling evidence, or a special master”); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d at 860–61 (post-Comcast remand; affirming certification of liability 
only class and “reserv[ing] all issues concerning damages for individual determination”); Sellars 
v. CRST Expedited, Inc., No. C15-117-LTS, 2017 WL 1193730, at *23–24 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 
2017) (bifurcation; “common issues as to liability will predominate over individual issues,” but 
“individualized questions will predominate” regarding “hostile work environment claim and 
damages as to both claims”); St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, No. 05-1119 L, 2016 WL 
2641792, at *25–26 (Ct. Cl. May 4, 2016) (accepting “representative evidence” on liability 
issues); Melgar v. Zicam LLC, No. 2:14-CV-00160-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 1267870, at *5 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (common issues “more prevalent or important” than individual issues 
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In class action cases, this familiar split serves a particularly 
important function: because the defendant’s liability is an issue that 
likely applies to all class members’ claims, while damages may be 
individualized, bifurcation often enables a case to proceed as a 
class action by ensuring that the common liability issues 
predominate while the individualized damages issues are addressed 
in some other manageable fashion.194 
Furthermore, bifurcation of common issues from individual issues “insulates 
a party from the possible prejudice of jointly trying certain issues.”195 For this 
and other reasons, bifurcation is ordered in a wide variety of contexts.196 
                                                                                                                           
regarding damages or alleged misrepresentations); Petersen v. Costco Wholesale Co., 312 F.R.D. 
565, 579 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“liability-only class, reserving for a second phase of trial the issue of 
damages”); Rollins v. Taylor Bros., Inc., No. C14-1414-JCC, 2016 WL 258523, at *7–12 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 21, 2016) (bifurcated trial; first phase for disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims and punitive damages and second phase for “backpay or particularized injunctive relief and 
compensatory damages, as well as the individual’s share of any punitive damages”); Lilly v. 
Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-cv-02998-JST, 2015 WL 1248027, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015) 
(preliminary approval of class settlement of liability issues only). 
 Class actions may also be split into separate issues, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When 
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular 
issues.”); see 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:89–4:92, at 
375–96 (5th ed. 2012), or subclasses, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be 
divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”); see 3 WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§ 7.29–7:32, at 148–66 (5th ed. 2013). 
 194 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:3, at 9 (5th ed. 
2014) (citations omitted); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.631, at 121–22 
(2004) (“[T]he judge may consider severing for a joint trial those issues on which common 
evidence predominates, reserving noncommon issues for subsequent individual trials.”). But see 
Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 479 (8th Cir. 2016) (reversing Rule 23(b)(3) class 
certification because federal district court eliminated “any efficiencies gained by the class 
proceeding because many individual issues [e.g., “property-by-property assessment”] will require 
trial”). 
 195 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:4, at 13 (5th ed. 
2014). A federal district court can also address individual issues by “appointing a magistrate judge 
or special master to preside over individual damages proceedings,” “decertifying the class after the 
liability trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to prove 
damages,” “creating subclasses,” or “altering or amending the class.” In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.), overruled 
on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); see 
Epenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 196 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:4, at 15 (5th ed. 
2014) (noting “trial bifurcation is widely accepted”); see, e.g., Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 
F.3d 554, 564–66 (6th Cir. 2007) (Federal Communications Act); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 
256, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots, 
242 F.3d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 2001) (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and Railway 
Labor Act). 
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F. Sampling and Extrapolation 
To address classwide damages issues raised at the class certification 
stage, an innovative plaintiff should consider proposing to select a random 
sample of class members’ damages claims for adjudications and then 
extrapolate those results to the rest of the class.197 As demonstrated in Part IV, 
a properly devised sampling methodology can achieve the goals of Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance and superiority: “economies of time, effort, and 
expense,” while promoting “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly 
situated.”198 Unquestionably, a federal district court has the authority to 
entertain such a proposal. Rule 23(d)(1)(A) grants the court broad discretion 
to “issue orders that . . . determine the course of [class action] proceedings or 
prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting 
evidence or argument.”199 A sampling procedure has obvious efficiency 
benefits, as it obviates the need to expend resources trying numerous claims, 
thereby reducing the parties’ transaction costs, as well as conserving valuable 
judicial resources. 
Moreover, as also demonstrated in Part IV, if a proper statistical 
methodology is followed, sampling may also produce more accurate and 
more reliable results than those produced by separate adjudications of each 
class member’s damages claim.200 
                                                                                                                           
 197 One or more “bellwether” trials may be held to inform the parties and the court. 4 
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:11–11:20, at 41–70 (5th ed. 
2014). “Bellwether” refers to: 
[A] sheep that leads a flock, around whose neck a bell is hung. In a bellwether trial 
procedure, a random sample of cases large enough to yield reliable results is tried to 
a jury. A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a basis for 
resolving the remaining cases. Judges currently use bellwether trials informally in 
mass tort litigation to assist in valuing cases and to encourage settlement. 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (2008) (citations 
omitted). As the author points out, “[t]he central difficulty of bellwether trials is the reference 
class problem . . . . caused by heterogeneity within the group of plaintiffs to whom bellwether 
verdicts are to be extrapolated.” Id. at 605 (citing Mark Colyvan et al., Is It a Crime to Belong to a 
Reference Class?, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 168, 172 (2001)). 
 198 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 
amendment); cf. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 278 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2011) (selecting non-
random sample of class members, up to fifteen selected by each side, to determine aggregate 
damages). 
 199 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A). 
 200 See Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in 
Class Action Litigation, 14 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 69, 78–83 (2015) [hereinafter 
Aggregating for Accuracy] (deriving “conditions under which sampling will increase accuracy”); 
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 597 (2012) (“The 
practice of informal sampling in aggregate litigation demonstrates that in being forced to give 
reasons for how similarly situated people are treated, adjudicators produce a system that is fairer 
across the board than individual, decentralized litigation.”); Michael J. Saks & Peter David 
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of 
Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 833, 851 (1992) (arguing that “[a]ggregation, properly 
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As one commentator explained: 
For statistical evidence, [“the reason why the sample average is 
allowed to affect or control outcomes”] is to achieve the best 
possible jury or judge determination of the relevant issue based on 
the facts of an individual case. Since the aim is to get as close to the 
right decision as possible, the focus is on the probative value of the 
sample average compared to other available evidence.201 
 However, as the brief bleak history of sampling evidence in class actions 
reveals, supra Part I, few federal courts have allowed this form of statistical 
evidence to prove classwide issues. But, as suggested supra Part II, the fault 
often lies not with the reliability and fairness of the methodology, but rather 
with its improper application. By way of examples only, courts have properly 
rejected statistical evidence that does not conform to rigorous scientific 
standards.202 
                                                                                                                           
conducted, will provide awards that are more accurate, not less” and that aggregation “can 
systematically increase accuracy [and] reduce bias”); Lawrence Walker & John Monahan, 
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1998) (noting “[t]he availability of highly 
efficient survey techniques for proving damages would open the door to certification of many 
proposed mass tort class actions”); Lawrence Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the 
Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 988 (2007) (random sampling may produce “a more accurate 
picture of the facts at issue than the study of each case one-by-one”); see also David Rosenberg, A 
Sampling-Based System of Civil Liability, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 635, 649 (2014) 
(“[W]hen deterrence motivates our desire for knowledge about defendants’ liability and damages, 
then . . . ‘accuracy’ is as fully achieved by statistical, on-average aggregate assessments as by 
particularistic, individualized determinations.”). 
 201 Bone, supra note 13, at 613. 
 202 See, e.g., DiCuio v. Brother Int’l Corp., 653 F. App’x 109, 112–14 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(comparing Tyson and affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant in putative consumer 
fraud class action where “a jury could [not] draw such an inference” based on plaintiffs’ 
“representative evidence”); Espenscheid, 705 F.3d at 774 (“There is no suggestion that sampling 
methods used in statistical analysis were employed to create a random sample of class members to 
be the witnesses, or more precisely random samples, each one composed of victims of a particular 
type of alleged violation.”); Marlo v. UPS, Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (survey 
designer “stated in her deposition that she did not know whether the sample was representative”), 
for additional opinions, see 453 F. App’x 682 (9th Cir. 2011); Senne v. Kansas City Royals 
Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 587–90 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying “‘tailored’ Daubert standard” 
and excluding expert evidence supporting motion to certify Rule 23(b)(3) class because 
methodology and survey results were “unreliable” due to “self-interest bias” among other things); 
United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833, 
at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016) (granting defendant summary judgment on all but one claim 
because relator’s “statistical evidence,” including extrapolation, was “unreliable” and expert’s 
analysis “deficient, because his methodology was fundamentally flawed” due to “failure to select a 
random sample or to account for relevant variables”); In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg., 315 F.R.D. 
116, 127–28 (D. Mass. 2016) (denying Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in RICO case because of 
“fundamental flaw” in plaintiff’s expert’s approach); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 
550, 568 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“It is unclear whether the employees were randomly selected or even 
whether the population of employees was statistically significant (assuming that the selection was 
random, which, again, is unclear).”). 
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In addition to obvious economies, the primary argument to admit 
statistical evidence is that it assists the fact finder to determine a disputed 
issue based on the facts of the case. 
The most common and salient argument against a sampling methodology 
is that extrapolating from adjudications of sample claims to non-adjudicated 
claims introduces error.203 For example, although sampling may enable all 
class members with valid claims to recover, it may result in over-recovery 
and under-recovery, and allow class members to recover who do not have 
valid claims. If all claims were separately adjudicated, the argument goes, 
extrapolation error would be eliminated. This argument, however, ignores, 
among other important things, that triers of fact, especially juries, introduce 
error in the form of unpredictability. With proper sampling, such error can be 
minimized. Thus, although sampling may introduce extrapolation error, it 
reduces judgment variability.204 
In the end, “whether sampling or individual adjudication produces more 
accurate results depends on the homogeneity of the group of cases and an 
empirical question about jury behavior.”205 In addition: 
[A] sample picked randomly from the correct reference class will 
yield fair results, so long as the extrapolation process is able to take 
into account objectively verifiable variables and does not 
systematically devalue certain categories of claims for socially 
undesirable and legally impermissible reasons.206 
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF SAMPLING EVIDENCE TO  
PROVE INDIVIDUAL DAMAGES 
A. Revisiting Tyson 
In Tyson, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that “[o]ne way for 
[plaintiffs] to show . . . that the sample relied upon . . . is a permissible 
method of proving classwide liability is by showing that each class member 
could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought 
an individual action.”207 The Court explained that, “[i]f the sample could have 
sustained a reasonable jury finding as to hours worked in each employee’s 
individual action, that sample is a permissible means of establishing the 
                                                                                                                           
 203 Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833. 
 204 See infra Part IV. See generally Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 75–78; 
Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective on Trial 
Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 958–60 (2012); Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–37. 
 205 Cheng, supra note 204, at 960; see Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 78–83 
(deriving homogeneity conditions necessary and sufficient to improve accuracy). 
 206 Lahav, supra note 200, at 617. 
 207 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016); id. at 1050 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring); id. at 1053 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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employees’ hours worked in a class action.”208 By parallel reasoning, 
sampling evidence is a permissible method of proving individual damages in 
a class action if each class member could rely on it to establish damages in an 
individual action. The admissibility of sampling evidence to prove individual 
damages in a class action therefore depends on whether it is relevant and 
reliable to prove damages in an individual action brought by any member of 
the class.209 
The relevance inquiry can be quickly and positively answered. As long 
as sampling evidence is based on the facts of the case, that is, it “fit[s]” the 
case, and there is “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,” for 
example, individual damages, sampling evidence is relevant.210 Assuming the 
relevance of sampling evidence, we build on recent articles regarding 
sampling and accuracy to show that, under appropriate circumstances, 
sampling evidence is admissible to prove individual damages at the Rule 
23(b)(3) class certification stage, even where individual damages claims are 
known to be heterogeneous. 
As discussed in Parts II and III, plaintiffs have attempted to introduce 
sampling evidence to establish individual damages to satisfy the Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite.211 Where individual damages cannot be 
calculated formulaically, federal district courts frequently find that individual 
issues predominate over common issues and deny Rule 23(b)(3) class 
certification.212 But, if plaintiffs can demonstrate that sampling evidence 
pertaining to the entire class can be reliably applied to determine individual 
damages, then they should prevail in convincing a federal district court that 
common issues predominate over individual ones. 
Consider the circumstances in Tyson. Plaintiffs proposed a method to 
calculate classwide liability and aggregate damages. Tyson argued that 
plaintiffs’ expert’s study was “unrepresentative or inaccurate.”213 As 
explained below, in such circumstances, class plaintiffs can counter by 
arguing that sampling evidence (similar to that introduced in Tyson) can not 
only reliably prove classwide liability and aggregate damages, but can 
determine individual damages as well. 
Assume that videotaped observations of a representative sample of 
workers in the class reveal that each sampled worker spends approximately 
twenty minutes “donning” and “doffing” safety gear and that “donning” and 
“doffing” times are the only factor that distinguishes one class member’s 
                                                                                                                           
 208 Id. at 1046-47. 
 209 See id; supra notes 82–137 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591–92 (1993). 
 211 See supra notes 178–189 and accompanying text. 
 212 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 213 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 
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damages claim from another.214 Plaintiffs may persuasively argue, relying on 
Tyson, that expert testimony regarding the sampling evidence is reliable to 
establish damages for each class member and is admissible to prove 
individual damages. Therefore, the sampling evidence would also be 
admissible to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance prerequisite.215 
Now, assume that the videotaped observations disclose more variability 
among the sampled workers’ “donning” and “doffing” times. In that case, the 
pertinent question is: How variable is too variable? Or, in other words, what 
degree of homogeneity should be required to demonstrate that sampling 
evidence is reliable to prove individual damages? For example, what variance 
of “donning” and “doffing” times should be acceptable for a federal district 
court to admit the sampling evidence to prove individual damages? 
It is important to keep in mind that a federal district court ruling on the 
admissibility of sampling evidence is not deciding whether the finder of fact 
must rely on it, or, for example, the sample mean in particular, to calculate 
individual damages for each class member. Rather, the court is only deciding 
whether the sampling evidence is sufficiently reliable to present to the trier of 
fact for consideration when awarding individual damages.216 Ignoring, for 
now, the possibility that some class members do not have valid claims 
because they did not work in excess of forty hours in a week, that is, they 
cannot prove that the class defendant is liable to them, we posit that, at some 
level of homogeneity, the sampling evidence is reliable and therefore is 
admissible into evidence to prove individual damages. 
We will demonstrate below that one method to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance, notwithstanding variable individual damages, is to show: (1) a 
sample of class members’ claims is representative and provides reliable 
measures of central tendency and variability; and (2) individual damages are 
not too variable. We assume that plaintiffs will propose a sampling method 
“ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science” to meet the first 
criterion.217 Therefore, we now address the second criterion, and determine 
how variable is too variable. 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Alternatively, consider circumstances where “donning” and “doffing” times are found by a 
court, acting as the finder of fact, to be homogeneous. For example, if a federal district court finds, 
based on sampling evidence, that most workers perform “donning” and “doffing” activities in 
twenty minutes, and that that is also approximately the minimum “donning” and “doffing” time in 
the sample, the court could find that more than twenty minutes is unreasonable, and use twenty 
minutes as the basis for calculating individual damages. 
 215 See supra notes 82–206 and accompanying text. 
 216 See generally Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1036. 
 217 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The “principles and methods” of sampling are generally 
recognized “methods and procedures of science.” FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; 
see supra notes 138–206 and accompanying text. 
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B. Threshold for Homogeneity 
We derive a threshold for determining whether class damages claims are 
sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of sampling evidence to 
prove individual damages. We begin by developing a framework for our 
analysis by defining the concepts of judgment variability, claim variability, 
and the accuracy of damages awards. We argue that, for purposes of 
satisfying the predominance prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3), accuracy is an 
appropriate standard for evidentiary reliability. Then, we show that, when 
judgment variability exceeds claim variability, sampling evidence improves 
accuracy and thereby establishes evidentiary reliability. 
C. Claim Variability and Judgment Variability 
In a recent article, one of the authors described the concepts of claim 
variability and judgment variability. As defined, claim variability represents 
the substantive, that is, factual, differences among a set of claims. Judgment 
variability, on the other hand, is the randomness associated with the 
adjudication of a claim, or specifically, the differences in the outcomes that 
would result from repeated adjudications of the same claim.218 Thus, for 
present purposes, we postulate that, if each class member’s damages claim 
were adjudicated individually, the variability of the resulting damages awards 
could be attributed to both claim variability and judgment variability. To refine 
the inquiry addressed here: What threshold amount of claim variability is 
acceptable for sampling evidence to be admissible to prove individual 
damages? 
D. Variability, Accuracy, and Evidentiary Reliability 
As discussed in Part II, among the “general standards” that a federal 
district court “must use to assess the reliability . . . of proffered expert 
testimony,” are whether the “testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods” and whether the “expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.”219 According to the Daubert Court, 
evidentiary reliability means “trustworthiness” and, “[i]n a case involving 
scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific 
                                                                                                                           
 218 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 75–78; see Hillel J. Bavli, Sampling and 
Reliability in Class Action Litigation, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 207, 209–10, http://
cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/BAVLI_2016_207.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ5F-GG7N]; 
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–37. 
 219 FED. R. EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment; see 
supra notes 138–206 and accompanying text. 
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validity.”220 In turn, scientific validity is an affirmative answer to the question: 
“[D]oes the principle support what it purports to show?”221 
In the context of sampling to determine individual damages for Rule 
23(b)(3) class members (and, likely, in most contexts), evidentiary reliability 
can be best understood in terms of accuracy: Does the sampling evidence 
produce a more accurate determination of individual damages? 
More formally, assume that, for each class member’s claim, there is a 
“correct” amount of damages that would be awarded if the trier of fact were 
omniscient, that is, possessed complete information regarding the material 
facts of the claim and certainty about the governing law.222 Further, for 
simplicity, assume that the “correct” damages award would be the arithmetic 
mean of the outcomes of an infinite number of adjudications of the claim 
under different circumstances (e.g., different jurors, judges, lawyers, 
presentations of evidence, etc.).223 As explained in Aggregating for Accuracy, 
because no trier of fact is omniscient, the trier of fact must arrive at an 
estimate of the “correct” amount of damages.224 We can then define error and 
accuracy, respectively, in terms of the distance of an actual damages award 
from, and the proximity of an actual damages award to, the “correct” 
damages award.225 
Specifically, we can define error in terms of mean squared error 
(“MSE”), which is a combination of bias and variance.226 Here, bias 
represents “systematic error,”227 or the difference between the “correct” 
award and the expected award (i.e., the mean of the awards that would result 
from infinite separate adjudications). For example, sampling evidence 
                                                                                                                           
 220 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (citation omitted). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74–75; Bavli, supra note 218, at 209–10; 
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–34. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
(1986) (describing “an imaginary judge [called Hercules] of superhuman intellectual power and 
patience” who seeks to identify “the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice,” id. at 239, 225). Alternatively, it can be assumed that there is a distribution of “correct” 
damages awards that reflects, for example, incomplete information or uncertainty about the 
governing law. 
 223 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74–75; Bavli, supra note 218, at 209–10; 
Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, at 833–34. Various measures of central tendency can be used to 
characterize the “correct” damages award. We use the arithmetic mean. Note that our assumption 
that an award is “correct” on average is conservative in the sense that all changes in the magnitude 
of a damages award caused by the introduction of sampling evidence are assumed to harm the 
accuracy of the award—regardless whether such changes are in fact harmful or helpful in practice. 
 224 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 74. 
 225 Id. at 74–75. 
 226 Id. at 81–83. More precisely, MSE is defined as the expectation of the squared differences 
between the “correct” awards and the actual awards, which is equal to a combination of the 
squared bias and variance. See Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the 
Determination of Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 15 
(2017) [hereinafter The Logic of CCG] (defining MSE in the damages context). 
 227 See Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 240. 
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introduces bias (under our assumptions) if it causes a change in the expected 
magnitude of an award. Variance represents “random error,” or the dispersion 
of awards around the mean award.228 For example, sampling evidence 
reduces the variance of an award if it would reduce the dispersion of repeated 
adjudications of the corresponding claim. Finally, we can define accuracy as 
the inverse of error: As error decreases, accuracy increases, and vice versa. 
Consider again the factual circumstances in Tyson. Assume that we 
selected a subclass of workers, and that a representative sample of videotaped 
observations showed that their mean “donning” and “doffing” time was 
eighteen minutes. If the damages awarded to each selected class member 
were based on the assumption that each worker spent eighteen minutes each 
day “donning” and “doffing” safety gear, each award would involve error 
reflecting the difference between damages based on eighteen minutes and 
damages based on the worker’s actual “donning” and “doffing” times.229 
The size of the error would depend, in part, on claim variability, that is, 
the variability in all the workers’ claims for “donning” and “doffing” times in 
excess of forty hours, because they took more or less than eighteen minutes to 
perform these tasks. In addition, the error would depend on judgment 
variability. For example, in Tyson, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ expert’s 
calculations that supported an aggregate damages award of approximately 
$6.7 million, the jury awarded classwide damages of about $2.9 million.230 A 
different jury could have awarded the amount requested ($6.7 million), or $1 
million, or some other amount. Judgment variability notwithstanding, 
however, there are actual (“true”) “donning” and “doffing” times for each 
class member. If the trier of fact were omniscient, the “correct” damages 
would be awarded to each class member based on the “true” times. Therefore, 
the error associated with using eighteen minutes “donning” and “doffing” 
times to calculate individual damages results from both claim variability and 
judgment variability.231 
                                                                                                                           
 228 The Logic of CCG, supra note 226, at 14–15; Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32 
at 239–40 (“The standard deviation [square root of variance] is a sort of mean deviation from the 
mean.”). Variance is defined more formally as the expectation of the squared differences between 
the actual damages awards and the expected damages award. See The Logic of CCG, supra note 
226, at 14–15. Note that our analysis does not rely on mean squared error as the definition of 
error. We use mean squared error for computational and interpretational convenience, but 
alternative measures of error could be used. 
 229 Keep in mind that we are still assuming that all class members have valid claims and are 
entitled to damages awards because they worked more than forty hours in one or more weeks. 
 230 136 S. Ct. at 1044. 
 231 Note that, although we define the concept of a “correct” award for simplicity, our analysis 
does not rely on the existence of a single “correct” award. See supra notes 222–225 and 
accompanying text. 
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E. Implications of Sampling for Accuracy and Reliability 
Sampling impacts the error resulting from both forms of variability, 
claim variability and judgment variability. For example, sampling can reduce 
error resulting from judgment variability by aggregating information across 
class members’ claims.232 To illustrate, consider the effect of replication, or 
multiple adjudications of the same individual claim: 
Consider a costly procedure through which the outcome of a claim is 
determined by averaging the verdicts resulting from ten independent 
“replications” of the trial, or “repeated adjudications” (involving, for 
example, different judges, juries, attorneys, presentations of 
evidence, etc.). Assuming the outcome is relatively unbiased, it is 
easy to show that following this procedure results in an accurate 
outcome—an outcome that is close to the “correct” outcome. 
Similarly, this procedure will produce an accurate outcome for each 
claim of each member of a putative class (or subclass). Replication 
thus increases the reliability of legal outcomes by reducing the error 
caused by judgment variability.233 
Without doubt, a replication procedure would be costly. But, in a class of 
identical, that is, homogeneous, claims, the full accuracy benefits of 
replication could be realized by extrapolating damages awards based on a 
representative sample of adjudicated claims to all non-adjudicated class 
claims.234 Moreover, the benefits of replication obtain whether the sampled 
units are damages awards, or a determinative variable, such as “donning” and 
“doffing” times.235 
The benefits of replication (and resulting aggregation of information 
about class damages claims) can also be realized with heterogeneous class 
damages claims. But, with heterogeneous claims, the accuracy benefits of 
replication with respect to judgment variability must be balanced with the 
introduction of error that results from applying a single aggregated value—for 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; Saks & Blanck, supra note 200, 
at 833–34. 
 233 Bavli, supra note 218, at 211; see also Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 77. 
 234 Bavli, supra note 218, at 211; see also Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 77. 
Although a federal district court may extrapolate damages awards for non-sampled claims, it may 
not, due to constitutional constraints and other reasons, replace adjudicated damages awards with 
extrapolated damages awards. See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 78–81 (citing 
cases); supra notes 62–64. 
 235 See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these 
types of representative evidence (that is, representative evidence based on damages awards or 
determinative variables) and the relationship between representative adjudications and 
representative evidence. 
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example, the mean of the damages awards from repeated adjudications—to a 
class of variable claims that may have distinct “correct” outcomes.236 
Returning to a federal district court’s “gatekeeping” role under Daubert, 
the admissibility of sampling evidence depends on whether the evidence is 
reliable. Restated for present purposes, admissibility depends on whether 
sampling evidence is “trustworthy” to prove individual damages.237 We argue 
here that evidentiary reliability is substantively equivalent to the concept of 
reliability explicated in Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation: 
“[T]he reliability of a legal procedure [is] the accuracy of the legal outcome 
that can be expected by following the procedure.”238 In particular, the 
reliability of sampling evidence is based on its effect on the accuracy of the 
individual damages awards. There is substantial support for this argument. 
The Daubert Court emphasized that, “[i]n a case involving scientific 
evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”239 And 
scientific validity “refers to the ability of a test to measure what it is supposed 
to measure—its accuracy.”240 
In this regard, the Reference Guide on Statistics and the Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence more generally discuss two components of 
error—what can be considered as variance and bias—when assessing the 
validity of a measurement. 
First, the Reference Guide on Statistics highlights the important role of 
scientific “reliability,” or consistency, in determining whether a measurement 
is scientifically “valid,”241  as well as the harmful effects of “random error” on 
estimation, and statistical inference more generally.242 It describes two 
different types of variability—“within-observer variability” and “between-
observer variability”—as relevant to assessing whether a measurement is 
scientifically reliable, and therefore whether the measurement is accurate.243 
Applying these concepts to our analysis, and viewing adjudications of class 
members’ claims as an estimation problem, they can be understood as 
elements of judgment variability. A trier of fact adjudicating the same 
                                                                                                                           
 236 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 82–83; see also Bavli, supra note 218, at 
212–14. 
 237 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
 238 Bavli, supra note 218, at 210 (emphasis omitted). 
 239 509 U.S. at 590 n.9; see also Paul C. Giannelli et al., Reference Guide on Forensic 
Identification Expertise, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 71–72 (Federal 
Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise]. 
 240 Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference 
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228 (“A valid measuring instrument measures what it is 
supposed to.”); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“[D]oes the principle support what it purports to 
show?”). 
 241 Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28; see also Reference Guide on 
Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72. 
 242 Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 240–41. 
 243 See id. at 228. 
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individual class member’s damages claim multiple times under different 
circumstances may award different amounts of damages, representing 
“within-observer variability.” In addition, different triers of fact adjudicating 
the same claim under identical circumstances may determine different 
damages awards, representing “between-observer variability.” Thus, when 
viewed in this light, the concept of accuracy, or “scientific validity,” is based, 
in part, on judgment variability.244 
Second, as explained in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 
“[v]alidity includes [scientific] reliability, but the converse is not necessarily 
true. Thus, a [scientifically] reliable, invalid technique will consistently yield 
inaccurate results.”245 “In addition to reliability, validity is needed. A valid 
measuring instrument measures what it is supposed to.”246 Therefore, the 
second component of validity, as described in the Reference Guide on 
Statistics, can be understood as bias. Contrasting this type of error from 
“random chance,” or “random error,” in the context of “inferences that may 
be drawn from a study,” the Reference Guide on Statistics remarks, “[t]he 
data might not address the issue of interest, might be systematically in error, 
or might be difficult to interpret because of confounding. Statisticians would 
group these concerns together under the rubric of ‘bias.’”247 
In sum, reliability of damages evidence can be evaluated in terms of its 
effect on the accuracy of the damages award. By this standard, where 
sampling evidence can be expected to improve accuracy, the evidence should 
be considered reliable and therefore admissible.248 
                                                                                                                           
 244 See Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; 
Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (“A reliable measuring instrument returns 
consistent measurements.”). As noted, “‘within-observer variability’ of judgments should be 
small—the same evaluator should rate essentially identical cases in similar ways” and “‘between-
observer variability’ should be small—different evaluators should rate the same cases in 
essentially the same way.” Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228. 
 245 Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference 
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228 (“Reliability is necessary but not sufficient to ensure 
accuracy.”). 
 246 Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228. 
 247 Id. at 240. The Reference Guide on Statistics also describes validity in terms of correlation, 
which, similarly, can be stated in terms of bias and variance. See id. at 228 (“the polygraph is not 
valid as a lie detector unless the measurements it makes are well correlated with lying”; “[a] 
common measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor and the criterion 
(e.g., test scores and later performance)”). 
 248 The expectation that sampling evidence improves accuracy is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for improving reliability. Where sampling evidence cannot be expected to 
improve accuracy, it does not necessarily follow that such evidence is not reliable. If sampling 
evidence cannot be expected to improve accuracy (and, moreover, if it cannot be shown to be 
expected to improve accuracy), this does not necessarily imply that such evidence is expected to 
reduce accuracy. 
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F. Threshold for Admissibility 
Consider again circumstances similar to Tyson. Consider two scenarios: 
one, sampling evidence is admitted to prove individual damages, or two, Rule 
23(b)(3) class certification is denied (at least for purposes of individual 
damages, but perhaps for liability and aggregate damages as well) and class 
members’ individual damages claims must be separately adjudicated. In the 
second scenario, we do not require that each class member actually proceed 
with an individual adjudication. We only require that class certification is 
denied and claims will be resolved by individual adjudications, if at all. 
Our immediate goal is to derive threshold heterogeneity conditions, that 
is, threshold claim variability conditions, under which sampling evidence is 
admissible to prove individual damages for all class members’ damages 
claims. We focus on the admissibility of the average of damages awarded for 
sampled claims, or the average of other operative values, such as “donning” 
and “doffing” times in Tyson, in sampled claims. Specifically, we focus on the 
admissibility of the mean of such values, which we call the “sample mean.” 
We are seeking conditions under which sampling evidence improves 
accuracy, notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the claims. In short, we want 
to know the values of claim variability for which sampling evidence can be 
said “to measure what it is supposed to measure,” ensuring its scientific 
validity and thus its evidentiary reliability.249 Below, we show that this 
threshold is the value at which claim variability equals judgment variability. 
We conclude that using sampling evidence, and specifically the sample mean, 
to estimate the damages for each claim of a heterogeneous class improves 
accuracy when judgment variability exceeds claim variability. 
G. Hierarchical Model 
Let us consider the problem in more formal terms. Assume that the 
damages award for a claim 𝑖𝑖, call it 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, is statistically distributed with mean 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and variance 𝜎𝜎
2, for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, .  .  .𝑁𝑁. Notationally, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖~(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜎𝜎2).250 This 
simply means that each of the 𝑁𝑁 claims will equal its “correct” award, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, on 
average, but that the award involves some degree of randomness or judgment 
variability, 𝜎𝜎2.251 Furthermore, to reflect the fact that the claims are related 
(as required to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) commonality), assume that the “correct” 
awards for the claims, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖’s, are distributed with a “global” mean 𝜇𝜇 and 
                                                                                                                           
 249 Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference 
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
 250 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note 
226, at 15–18. 
 251 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note 
226, at 15–18. 
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variance 𝜏𝜏2. Notationally, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖~(𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏2).252 In other words, the “correct” 
damages awards for the claims will equal the global mean, or 𝜇𝜇, on average, 
but display some degree of variability, 𝜏𝜏2, that is, claim variability. This 
recognizes the fact that the claims may differ substantively and involve 
distinct “correct” awards.253 
This model, known in statistics as a standard two-level hierarchical (or 
multilevel) model, allows for a very general methodology with few 
assumptions regarding the damages awards. The statistical model is depicted 
in Figure 1 below.254 
 
 
Figure 1. Image of hierarchical model with lower level 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖~(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎2) and upper level 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖~ (𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏2). Note that the shape and size of the distributions are for illustrative purposes only 
and are not drawn to scale. For example, the distributions are not necessarily “normal,” or in 
the shape of a bell curve, and the dispersion, or variance, of the lower level distributions are not 
necessarily less than that of the upper level. The points at the bottom of the lower-level 
distributions represent possible values of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, reflecting the respective means of each claim 𝑖𝑖 and 
judgment variability 𝜎𝜎2. 
Now, let us temporarily simplify the problem through abstraction for 
purposes of deriving an appropriate threshold. We are interested in 
measuring, or estimating, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖’s (“correct” damages awards). We want to 
know for what values of claim variability, 𝜏𝜏2, would applying the mean, 𝑋𝑋�𝑛𝑛, 
of a random sample of 𝑛𝑛 claims from a total of N claims, rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note 
226, at 15–18. 
 253 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 200, at 81–83; The Logic of CCG, supra note 
226, at 15–18. 
 254 This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG]. 
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individual damages awards, improve accuracy, where the criterion for 
accuracy is MSE (summed over N). 
Importantly, this framework applies whether the sampled units are 
damages awards—see, for example, discussions of Cimino (involving 
representative adjudications) and Hilao (involving representative evidence), 
supra Part I—or, as in Tyson, a variable that is determinative of the damages 
awards.255 In Tyson, for example, the sample “donning” and “doffing” times 
may be converted to damages awards (or vice versa) by applying a constant 
multiplier, that is, 150% of the hourly wage for each hour worked in excess of 
forty hours each week. 
                                                                                                                           
 255 Bavli, supra note 218, at 217–18; see Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 
(9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990); cf. Tyson, 
136 S. Ct. at 1041. Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation explains the relationship 
between representative evidence and representative adjudications as follows: 
[I]n Aggregating for Accuracy, an award in a heterogeneous class is modeled 
hierarchically: the “correct” awards in the class are distributed around some global 
mean, whereas each actual award is “drawn” from a distribution around each claim’s 
“correct” award. The former distribution represents claim variability, whereas the 
latter distribution represents judgment variability. In a homogeneous class, 
replication offers accuracy benefits by providing additional information regarding 
the “correct” award associated with the replicated claim, which otherwise would be 
obscured by judgment variability. In a heterogeneous class, sampling offers 
accuracy benefits, with respect to a certain claim, not by providing information 
regarding that claim’s “correct” award directly, but by providing information 
regarding the global mean around which all of the “correct” awards are distributed, 
and thereby regarding the “correct” award for the subject claim indirectly. Similarly, 
representative evidence, such as the type in dispute in Tyson Foods (where, for 
example, the sample reflects variability of measured donning and doffing times 
rather than judgment variability), offers accuracy benefits, with respect to a certain 
claim, by providing information regarding the global mean around which the 
“correct” awards are distributed, and thereby regarding the “correct” award for that 
claim in particular. Another way of understanding this is through “comparable-case 
guidance” (CCG) methods, whereby a court uses information regarding awards in 
prior comparable cases as guidance for a fact-finder’s determination of damages. 
The Logic of CCG examines the statistical mechanism by which CCG affects 
awards, and the conditions under which such evidence will improve accuracy. In 
particular, the paper explains that, under certain mild behavioral assumptions, the 
risk that such evidence would reduce accuracy—that error resulting from claim 
variability and bias would outweigh the accuracy benefits of reducing judgment 
variability—is minimal. Like CCG, representative evidence provides information 
regarding the distribution of “correct” awards for comparable claims, including the 
global mean, and, in turn, about the “correct” award for the subject claim. 
Bavli, supra note 218, at 218 n.67 (citations omitted). In addition, our model can be extended to 
representative evidence that is not immediately determinative of the claims’ damages awards. 
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Thus, let us derive the claim variability conditions, that is, the values of 
𝜏𝜏2, that yield greater accuracy when applying the sample mean, 𝑋𝑋�𝑛𝑛, to all 
claims, rather than an individual outcome, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, to each claim 𝑖𝑖:
256 
 
The converse can be shown to be true as well. Thus, given a sufficiently 
large sample, the error resulting from individual outcomes is greater than the 
error resulting from the sample mean (see Line (1)), if and only if, the lower-
level variance 𝜎𝜎2 (judgment variability) is greater than the upper-level 
variance 𝜏𝜏2 (claim variability) (see Line (4)).257 In other words, using the 
sample mean (the mean of awards for sampled class members’ damages 
claims) rather than individual outcomes (separate adjudications) results in 
greater accuracy, if and only if, judgment variability is greater than claim 
variability. Furthermore, conversely, assuming a reasonable sample size—
which we will assume for the remainder of Part IV—if judgment variability is 
greater than claim variability, using the sample mean, rather than individual 
outcomes, improves accuracy. 
This result is intuitive. The accuracy benefit associated with the use of 
the sample mean arises from the sharing of information across claims. 
Information sharing reduces the error caused by judgment variability. On the 
other hand, using the sample mean, rather than individual outcomes, gives 
rise to error resulting from applying a single point estimate to variable claims. 
By applying one value, albeit a value that benefits from information sharing, 
to heterogeneous claims that involve distinct “correct” awards, necessarily 
introduces error. 
                                                                                                                           
 256 This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG]. 
 257 As shown in the derivation (Line (3)), the necessary sample size will depend on the values 
of judgment variability and claim variability. However, if the estimated judgment variability is 
greater than the estimated claim variability, see infra notes 267–277 and accompanying text, a 
moderately-sized random sample would generally suffice to satisfy standards of reliability. Note, 
we could alternatively derive this result using certain additional assumptions. 
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Consider again the image in Figure 1, including the scale of the 
distributions, which would occur if judgment variability were far lower than 
claim variability. In that circumstance, there is little to gain from information 
sharing, because the individual outcomes are likely to approximate their 
respective “correct” awards. On the other hand, because claim variability is 
relatively high, using the sample mean would result in a high degree of error 
arising from the application of a single point estimate to very heterogeneous 
claims. However, if the lower-level distributions in Figure 1 were larger (i.e., 
involving greater variance) than the upper-level distribution—that is, if 
judgment variability were greater than claim variability—then there would be 
significant gain from information sharing (via the sample mean), which could 
eliminate significant error caused by random variation, or judgment 
variability. And, because claim variability would be relatively low, there 
would be relatively little error arising from applying a single point estimate to 
the relatively low-variability (although still heterogeneous) claims. 
To summarize, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability, 
applying sampling evidence, and particularly the sample mean, rather than 
individual outcomes (whether damages awards or, for example, “donning” 
and “doffing” times) to estimate the “correct” damages awards improves 
accuracy. Improving accuracy increases evidentiary reliability. In these 
circumstances, therefore, using sampling evidence improves evidentiary 
reliability. 
It is axiomatic that evidence proving individual damages can be relied 
on to establish damages in an individual action. When sampling evidence—
and a properly calculated sample mean in particular—improves accuracy, and 
hence reliability, it is admissible in an individual action. In short, the sample 
mean “could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding . . . if it were 
introduced in . . . [an] individual action.”258 It is, therefore, admissible in a 
class action. 
Our analysis does not rely on how a trier of fact will actually be 
influenced by expert sampling evidence. We simply adopt the standard for 
evidentiary reliability, which is based on scientific validity, to answer the 
questions: “[D]oes the principle support what it purports to show?”259 Does it 
“measure what it is supposed to measure?”260 The foregoing analysis answers 
each of these questions with a resounding “yes”—when judgment variability 
is greater than claim variability. 
It is noteworthy that the above hierarchical model and related analysis 
involve minimal assumptions regarding class members’ damages awards and 
material evidence (e.g., “donning” and “doffing” times), and are generally 
                                                                                                                           
 258 Tyson, 135 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 259 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
 260 Reference Guide on Forensic Identification Expertise, supra note 239, at 71–72; Reference 
Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 228. 
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accepted statistical methods that easily satisfy Daubert standards and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 criteria. For example, the model and methodology have 
“general acceptance,” “can be (and ha[ve] been) tested,” and have been 
“subjected to peer review and publication.”261 Moreover, expert testimony 
based on them would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence” and 
would be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” in compliance 
with Rule 702.262 
H. Correlation 
The above analysis can be restated in terms of correlation, which is 
among the most generally accepted methods in statistics and the sciences 
generally.263 
For example, in Tyson, consider the correlation between the “correct” 
damages awards for individual class members’ claims (independent variable), 
or, instead, the true “donning” and “doffing” times, and actual damages 
awards (dependent variable). Imagine a graph with the independent variable 
on the x-axis and the dependent variable on the y-axis, as depicted in the 
graphs in Figure 2 below. The variability of the data points would reflect the 
two types of variability we have been discussing—judgment variability and 
claim variability. The trier of fact does not know the “correct” damages 
awards but can estimate them based on the evidence introduced at trial. 
Therefore, there is generally a correlation between “correct” damages awards 
and actual damages awards (or, equivalently, “true” “donning” and “doffing” 
times and actual damages awards). 
But there is also judgment variability, or random variation. If judgment 
variability is high relative to claim variability, then the correlation would not 
be apparent. In particular, the estimate of the correlation coefficient, the value 
that represents the strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
would be close to zero, and would likely be found “insignificant,” with a high 
p-value, in the context of a hypothesis test.264 If claim variability were large 
relative to judgment variability, however, the correlation would be apparent, 
                                                                                                                           
 261 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 262 FED. R. EVID. 702. Significantly, the hierarchical model and derivation of the foregoing 
threshold standard for admissibility are abstracted from any specific legal circumstances. This 
elucidates their general acceptance and tested reliability, without confusion caused by context. 
Furthermore, the concepts explained, such as judgment variability and claim variability, have 
strong foundations in the literature (not to mention case law), and meet the requirements of 
Daubert and Rule 702. See generally, Cheng, supra note 204, at 955; Saks & Blanck, supra note 
200, at 833–37. 
 263 See, e.g., Reference Guide on Statistics, supra note 32, at 227–28 (“[g]iven independence, 
the correlation coefficient . . . between repeated measurements can be used as a measure of 
reliability”; “[a] common measure of validity is the correlation coefficient between the predictor 
and the criterion”). 
 264 See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text. 
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and the estimated correlation coefficient would likely be found 
“significant.”265 
 
Graph A 
 
 
Graph B 
 
 
Graph C 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of correlation between “correct,” or “true,” damages awards and actual 
damages awards at different levels of judgment variability.  
Consider, for example, the graphs in Figure 2.266 Graph A displays 
circumstances in which judgment variability is low relative to claim 
variability, and a correspondingly clear and strong correlation. Graph B 
displays circumstances in which judgment variability is closer to the value of 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text.  
 266 This graphic is available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-
review-content/BCLR/59-2/bavli-felter-graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ63-4VTG]. 
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claim variability, and a correspondingly possible—although weak, if any—
correlation. Graph C displays circumstances in which judgment variability 
exceeds claim variability, and a correspondingly zero or negligible 
correlation. The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate that it may be possible for 
putative class plaintiffs to argue, using hypothesis testing or confidence 
intervals, that, if there is no clear correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables, suggesting that judgment variability exceeds claim 
variability, then the sampling evidence improves accuracy and satisfies 
evidentiary criteria for reliability and admissibility. 
This approach is effectively a form of statistical “model testing.” The 
model being tested involves “group means”—or individual outcomes—which 
would be advantageous (with respect to accuracy) if there were a significant 
correlation. The alternative model is based on the “sample mean,” where all 
values of the independent variable are assumed to be associated with the same 
value—the sample mean—of the dependent variable. 
Of course, it is impossible to know the “correct” damages awards. But, 
reliable estimates can be derived through sampling. For example, in 
circumstances similar to those in Tyson, the independent variable on the x-
axis could be replaced with estimated damages awards based on the 
“donning” and “doffing” times observed in the sample. Plaintiffs may be able 
to use such estimates to demonstrate their argument in terms of correlation.267 
So far, we have not generally addressed how to estimate relevant model 
parameters, such as judgment variability and claim variability. Below, we 
offer recommendations. 
I. Estimating Claim Variability and Judgment Variability 
We have argued that, whether sampling evidence is reliable and 
therefore admissible to prove individual damages depends on claim 
variability and judgment variability. These variability parameters can be 
understood as having “true” fixed values. And, although it is impossible to 
ascertain their “true” values, it is possible to calculate reliable estimates.268 
J. Claim Variability and Samples 
Claim variability can often be estimated from the selected sample itself. 
For example, in wage and hour cases such as Tyson, the variability of class 
members’ damages claims frequently arises from a single variable, a single 
characteristic of the claims. This is true when the facts underlying one 
characteristic of the individual claims constitute the only facts that distinguish 
                                                                                                                           
 267 Note that, for correlation-based methods, because putative class plaintiffs have the burden 
of proving that their proffered evidence is reliable, it may be insufficient to perform a standard 
hypothesis test using a significance level of .05. 
 268 Bavli, supra note 218, at 209. 
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one claim from another; or because the court (e.g., by rulings or orders) or the 
parties (e.g., by stipulations) have narrowed the disputed material facts to one 
case-dispositive variable.269 In Tyson, the only characteristic of the class 
members’ claims that varied, with respect to damages, was the amount of 
time spent “donning” and “doffing” safety gear. In such “unidimensional” 
cases, a representative sample of claims can provide a reliable estimate of 
claim variability. For example, the claim variability of the damages claims 
among the workers in the “cut and retrim” departments could be estimated by 
measuring the variance of the “donning” and “doffing” times in the 
representative sample of workers in those departments. Or, more concretely 
(and to facilitate comparison to judgment variability), claim variability could 
be estimated by measuring the variance of statutory damages based on those 
times. 
Admittedly, some cases are ill-suited for this type of variance 
measurement. For example, Title VII employment discrimination cases 
frequently require analyses of numerous characteristics of each class 
member’s damages claim and involve too many variables (e.g., race, sex, 
education, job classification, seniority, etc.) to permit a reliable estimate of 
claim variability. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to compute reliable claim 
variability estimates even in cases where claim variability depends on more 
than one characteristic of class members’ claims. In circumstances similar to 
those in Tyson, “donning” and “doffing” times of the sampled workers could 
be used to compute damages awards, and to estimate claim variability in 
terms of damages awards. But, Tyson is also an example of a case where 
claim variability depends on two variables. Specifically, if we now eliminate 
the assumption that all class members had valid claims and were entitled to 
damages, then damages, in a sense, depend on two variables: “donning” and 
“doffing” times and whether (for each additional incremental unit of time) a 
class member worked more than forty hours in the week.270 Claim variability 
can be estimated directly from the sample by aggregating these variables and 
considering the total amount of “donning” and “doffing” times exceeding 
forty hours of work each week.271 
                                                                                                                           
 269 We are still assuming that all class members have valid claims and are entitled to damages. 
 270 See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
 271 Note, to compute damages, the times in excess of forty hours in a week could be 
multiplied by the statutorily-prescribed overtime rate (i.e., 150% of hourly wages). One might 
think that, if it is possible to calculate damages based on a statute or other prescribed formula, 
judgment variability must be low or zero. This is not necessarily so. In Tyson, the jury awarded 
classwide damages of about $2.9 million, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ expert’s formulaic 
calculations, based on the governing statute, supporting aggregate damages of approximately $6.7 
million. 136 S. Ct. at 1044. This disparity can likely be attributed to a number of factors. The point 
is, however, that multiple independent adjudications could result in variable outcomes. 
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By extension, it may be possible to apply standard statistical methods to 
compute a reliable estimate even in cases where claim variability depends on 
multiple characteristics of class members’ claims. 
K. Judgment Variability and “Test Cases” 
Judgment variability, on the other hand, cannot be estimated from the 
sample directly. Although it may be theoretically possible to isolate and 
quantify the characteristics of class members’ claims that would affect 
individual damages, judgment variability measures the dispersion of the 
individual damages awards, given the particular facts of each individual 
claim. Judgment variability reflects the variability of damages awards that 
would be observed by adjudicating a single claim multiple times, or the 
variability associated with the damages awards that is not attributable to 
substantive differences among the individual claims (i.e., that is not 
attributable to claim variability). Therefore, an obvious approach to 
estimating judgment variability contemplates the use of “test cases,” and 
specifically, replication. 
For example, if a single claim is adjudicated multiple times, the resulting 
damages awards can be used to estimate judgment variability for that claim 
and other substantively similar claims.272 Alternatively, if claim variability 
can be estimated, then a sample of claims can be adjudicated and claim 
variability subtracted from the total variability to estimate judgment 
variability. Thus, a robust method for estimating judgment variability is 
through the adjudication of “test cases,” where a representative sample of 
class members’ claims are adjudicated either by trials or alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) procedures. 
If judgment variability is unlikely to change significantly from claim to 
claim (which, as suggested, will often occur), then judgment variability can 
be determined relatively efficiently by adjudicating one “representative” 
claim before numerous triers of fact. Each trier of fact can observe the 
proceedings in a separate observation room, or together in a single room but 
then deliberate separately. In circumstances similar to those in Tyson, a 
“representative” claim based on average “donning” and “doffing” times can 
be selected for adjudication (perhaps following streamlined procedures 
presided over by magistrate judges or court-appointed special masters) before 
numerous triers of fact—say, five to ten separate juries of six. Each trier of 
                                                                                                                           
 272 It is not necessary that the claims be identical. It is likely that judgment variability is 
relatively similar across substantively similar claims, such as those in a class or subclass. For 
example, it is unlikely that the judgment variability associated with a claim in Tyson based on 
“donning” and “doffing” times of eighteen minutes is significantly different from that associated 
with a claim based on “donning” and “doffing” times of twenty-two minutes. 
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fact can arrive independently at a damages award, and the variability of the 
awards can be used to estimate judgment variability. 
This “test case” procedure captures some, but not all, sources of 
judgment variability. Adopting the language of the Reference Guide on 
Statistics, this procedure focuses on “between-observer variability” rather 
than “within-observer variability,” because the claim is adjudicated only once 
by each “observer,” that is, each trier of fact.273 This procedure may capture 
certain aspects of “within-observer variability,” but, in any event, omits 
certain significant sources of judgment variability, such as variations in the 
presentations of evidence. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the procedure is 
relatively inexpensive and convenient. Furthermore, to the extent that it does 
not capture certain sources of judgment variability, the calculation of 
judgment variability will be, if anything, conservative—that is, it will 
understate judgment variability. 
Of course, the “test case” procedure can be modified to suit the 
circumstances of each case. A more accurate, but more costly, method to 
determine judgment variability is to adjudicate a selected claim multiple 
times before multiple triers of fact. In certain cases, it may be beneficial to 
adopt the “test case” procedure for subclasses where subclassification is 
capable of neutralizing a major source of claim variability and thereby 
stabilizing, or making relatively consistent, judgment variability within each 
subclass.274 
A more robust procedure involves selecting a “representative” sample of 
claims for adjudications. Each sampled claim can be adjudicated multiple 
times (again, perhaps following streamlined procedures presided over by 
magistrate judges or court-appointed special masters) to determine judgment 
variability for each claim. These determinations can then be “aggregated” 
(e.g., by averaging) to estimate judgment variability for the claims in the 
entire class (or subclass). This procedure is costly, but it captures various 
sources of judgment variability and is more robust to variations in judgment 
variability across class claims. 
In another alternative, each claim in a “representative” sample of claims 
can be adjudicated once, the variability of the resulting damages awards can 
be computed, and the claim variability subtracted from the result. This 
procedure may be less costly than adjudicating each claim multiple times, but 
it captures fewer sources of judgment variability and relies on the accuracy of 
the claim variability computation. 
In any event, if class plaintiffs wish to present expert testimony 
regarding a correlation analysis similar to that described earlier, they may 
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propose a procedure to adjudicate multiple claims multiple times.275 To 
determine whether judgment variability exceeds claim variability in a case 
similar to Tyson, a federal district court can adjudicate “representative” claims 
at different “donning” and “doffing” times, each multiple times.  For 
example, the court can try a “typical” claim involving five minutes “donning” 
and “doffing” times, ten minutes “donning” and “doffing” times, fifteen 
minutes “donning” and doffing” times, and so on, each adjudication using 
multiple (e.g., four to six) juries of six. This way, the resulting damages 
awards would capture both claim variability (reflecting different times) and 
judgment variability (reflecting different outcomes by different triers of fact); 
and plaintiffs can use the resulting data to test hypotheses or derive 
confidence intervals related to the relevant correlation coefficients. In Figure 
2, sample “donning” and “doffing” times can be used as estimates of “true” 
“donning” and “doffing” times for the independent variable on the x-axis and 
damages awards can be used as the dependent variable on the y-axis, thus 
allowing the possibility of correlation-based arguments. 
The basic point is that “test cases,” and specifically replication, can be 
used (with varying levels of costs) to arrive at reliable estimates of judgment 
variability and claim variability, as well as other values, such as relevant 
correlation coefficients. The procedures are not mutually exclusive and can be 
tailored to the circumstances of each class action. 
Furthermore, a federal district court can reduce the costs of determining 
damages awards for sampled class members by lowering the required 
judgment variability threshold so that relatively inexpensive methods (such as 
adjudicating a single claim before numerous triers of fact) can be used 
notwithstanding less accurate, but conservative (if anything), results. Under 
certain circumstances, a court can subclassify, or “stratify,” a class to 
neutralize, or “control for,” sources of claim variability, and then sample—
and eventually award individual damages—within each subclass.276 These 
procedures can be employed to obtain relatively (or at least moderately) 
homogeneous subclasses, so that detection of a relatively low level of 
judgment variability would be sufficient to confidently conclude that 
judgment variability exceeds claim variability within a subclass, 
notwithstanding a less costly estimation procedure. 
Additionally, in some cases, even where class members’ damages claims 
are heterogeneous, a federal district court, acting as the finder of fact, could 
find that certain variability is immaterial, rendering the claims less variable (or 
even homogeneous). In circumstances similar to those in Tyson, for example, a 
court can find that a large number of workers in the “cut and retrim” 
departments had “donning” and “doffing” times of approximately twenty 
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minutes, and that workers who spent more time “donning” and “doffing” 
safety gear were not deserving of additional compensation. In such cases—and 
particularly in cases in which the court’s findings reduce claim variability 
significantly—less costly estimation procedures are even more feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court decision in Tyson revitalized the role of sampling in 
class actions. The Tyson Court analyzed sampling as an evidentiary issue and 
unanimously ruled that sampling evidence is a permissible method to prove 
classwide claims if it is shown “that each class member could have relied on” 
the evidence in an individual action.277 To paraphrase the Tyson Court, when 
class members are “similarly situated,” there is a “role for representative 
evidence,” in both individual and class adjudications.278 When class members 
are “similarly situated,” “experiences of a subset of [class members] can be 
probative as to the experiences of all of them.”279 And, in such cases, a “just 
and reasonable” inference can be drawn from the sampling evidence to prove 
a claim of each class member.280 
After Tyson, federal courts have understandably been more receptive to 
plaintiffs’ efforts to introduce sampling evidence to prove classwide liability, 
and occasionally aggregate damages, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. This is an 
important development because sampling is often the only practicable method 
to prove classwide liability and damages and still satisfy the predominance 
prerequisite of the Rule. Yet, federal courts continue to refuse to certify 
individual damages issues because they find that individual issues, especially 
the calculations of individual damages, defeat the predominance of common 
issues. 
In this Article, after examining a brief bleak history of sampling 
evidence in federal court class actions, we analyzed the law governing the 
admissibility of expert evidence and the certification of Rule 23(b)(3) 
damages class actions. As we explained, the admissibility of sampling 
evidence depends on its relevance and, most importantly, its reliability. We 
demonstrated how sampling evidence can satisfy Daubert and Rule 702 
standards and the prerequisites for Rule 23(b)(3) classes. 
While being careful to comply with these standards and prerequisites, 
we developed a method and derived a threshold to determine whether class 
damages claims are sufficiently homogeneous to justify the admissibility of 
sampling evidence to prove individual damages. 
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We argued that accuracy is an appropriate standard for evidentiary 
reliability. We then introduced two defined terms, judgment variability and 
claim variability, and, employing generally accepted statistical methods, we 
demonstrated that, when judgment variability exceeds claim variability, 
sampling evidence improves accuracy and evidentiary reliability, and therefore 
is admissible to prove individual damages. Finally, we recommended several 
procedures to evaluate whether damages claims of a putative class satisfy the 
derived threshold. 
In conclusion, we argue that our proposed method to prove individual 
damages achieves the goals of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, as stated by the 
Supreme Court. Federal courts and parties that follow the proposed method 
will realize “economies of time, effort, and expense.”281 And, the proposed 
method promotes “uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, 
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results.”282 
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